Pakistan's decades-old Kashmir story starts coming apart in PoK

For decades, Pakistan's case on Kashmir rested on a simple proposition. India was the oppressor and Pakistan was the champion of Kashmiris. Every diplomatic campaign, every speech at the United Nations and every attempt to internationalise the dispute drew legitimacy from that claim. But now that narrative has suffered a blow that may prove difficult to recover from. As Pakistani security forces were accused of killing dozens of protesters in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), the country's defence minister publicly likened those protesters to "enemies like India". It was a statement that would have been almost unimaginable in the history of Pakistan's Kashmir policy.

Though Pakistan continues to possess the intent and capacity to sponsor terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, the narrative that sought to morally justify such a policy is showing signs of fraying. The killings in PoK, the growing criticism from within Pakistan itself, scattered expressions of pro-India sentiment in the territory and even protests by sections of the British Kashmiri diaspora together point to something deeper than another cycle of unrest. They suggest that Pakistan's traditional claim to speak for Kashmiris is now being challenged by Kashmiris themselves.

A movement Pakistan did not expect


The immediate trigger for killings in PoK by Pakistani security forces is electoral reform. The Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) has spent months mobilising against Pakistan's decision to retain 12 reserved seats in the PoK assembly for refugees from J&K and their descendants who live elsewhere in Pakistan. Protesters argue that the arrangement allows Islamabad to shape governments in a territory whose residents are denied full control over their own politics. The movement also taps into older grievances over electricity prices, inflation, resource sharing and political autonomy.

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The protests escalated through June and July. JAAC was banned under anti-terrorism laws. Hundreds of activists were detained. Internet and mobile services were repeatedly shut down. International human rights organisations criticised the crackdown and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for impartial investigations into the deaths and meaningful political dialogue.

The violence reached a new level this week when JAAC alleged that Pakistani security forces opened fire on peaceful demonstrators, killing at least 30 people over two days. Pakistani authorities denied deliberately targeting civilians and accused India of encouraging the unrest.

The rupture in the Kashmir rhetoric

Governments often use harsh language during periods of unrest. Yet Khawaja Asif's remarks stood apart even in that context. "I put the protesters of Azad Kashmir in the same category as India and consider them also as enemies like India," Pakistan's defence minister said while defending the state's response. The significance of the statement lies less in its immediate political impact than in what it reveals about the strain on Pakistan's traditional messaging.

For decades, Pakistan's official position has been that it speaks on behalf of Kashmiris resisting Indian rule. Kashmiris were portrayed as victims whose struggle enjoyed Pakistan's political, diplomatic and moral backing. Every government in Islamabad, civilian or military, worked within that framework. It is difficult to find another instance where a senior serving Pakistani minister publicly described Kashmiri protesters from PoK enemies like India or clubbed them with India. But by equating protesting Kashmiris with Pakistan's principal adversary, he crossed a rhetorical line that previous governments had carefully avoided.

Pakistan continues to argue internationally that it is the defender of Kashmiri aspirations but when those aspirations take the form of protests against Pakistan's own governance, the response has been bullets, arrests, internet blackouts and the language of internal enemies. But now it has gone a step too far by bracketing Kashmiri protestors with Indian enemies.

Pakistani author Ayesha Siddiqa wrote on X today: "Pakistan’s security establishment for long saw Kashmiris from both sides of the border looking at Pakistan as their hope. Art 370 and inability of the security establishment to do anything was the first crack and this incessant and brutal treatment in AJK is the second crack. Just imagine Kashmiris on other side of the border thinking if this is a Pakistan they want to join."

Siddiqa's observation matters because it comes from a Pakistani scholar who has consistently examined the military's role in national security. Her position underlines that the moral authority Pakistan long claimed on the issue is becoming harder to sustain when the world's attention shifts from J&K to Pakistan's own conduct in PoK.

Also Read | PoJK protest group urges UN, OIC to act on Pakistan's human rights abuses

The shadow of Article 370

No discussion of this moment is complete without acknowledging how the political landscape has changed since August 2019. The abrogation of Article 370 was one of the most consequential decisions in independent India's history. Critics described it as a blow to federalism and democratic consent while supporters argued it would integrate J&K more closely with the rest of the country and create conditions for development and security.

Seven years later, observable facts stand out. The Kashmir Valley has not witnessed the sustained, mass separatist street mobilisations that repeatedly paralysed the region before scrapping of Article 370. Separatist organisations have lost much of their public visibility. The discourse has turned to development, especially in comparison to PoK. Mainstream parties increasingly focus on governance, elections and restoration of statehood rather than separatist rhetoric.

This doesn't mean all political grievances in the Valley have disappeared. But it has altered the visual and political contrast across the Line of Control.

At the very moment PoK is convulsed by protests over governance and representation and dozens of killings by Pakistani forces, J&K is more often being discussed in terms of infrastructure, tourism, rail connectivity and investment than street uprisings. That contrast inevitably shapes perceptions among people living on both sides of the divide.

A pro-India slant?

It would be inaccurate to claim that PoK is suddenly turning pro-India. There is no reliable sign to support such a conclusion. Public opinion remains diverse. Many residents seek greater autonomy rather than integration with either country.

But over the past few years, social media has increasingly featured voices from PoK praising infrastructure development in J&K or openly expressing admiration for India's economic progress. Videos circulating online have shown protesters chanting slogans asking India to help or intervene. Such sentiments remain limited and impossible to quantify. Even so, their public expression would once have been almost unthinkable.

Pakistan has traditionally relied on the assumption that even dissatisfied residents of PoK would continue to see India as the larger adversary. If even a fringe section now views India more favourably than before, it strikes at the emotional foundation of Pakistan's Kashmir narrative. If it grows, which is possible given the persistent protests in PoK and the rise of a discourse of development in J&K that offers a stark contrast, Pakistani regime will find tables turned on it.

Signals from the diaspora

Another striking development happened thousands of miles away. Sections of the British Kashmiri diaspora gathered outside the Pakistani consulate to protest the killings in PoK and demand accountability. Diaspora politics around Kashmir has historically been directed against India. Demonstrations targeting Pakistan over its own handling of Kashmir have been rare.

Diaspora protests do not necessarily reflect opinion inside the territory or even the whole Kashmiri diaspora. But they can change international perception. For decades, Pakistan benefited from diaspora activism that amplified its position against India on Kashmir. Seeing that energy redirected against Islamabad is symbolically important.

A narrative under pressure

Pakistan's security establishment can continue to support terror in J&K, run diplomatic campaigns against India and keep raising Kashmir in international forums. But its narrative will start to show holes. For years, Pakistan asked the world to judge India by how it treated Kashmiris. But now Pakistan will face the uncomfortable question of how it treats Kashmiris in PoK.

The issue is no longer confined to claims from India. Kashmiris themselves are protesting Pakistan's policies rather than India's and the UN and other global bodies have expressed concern over the ongoing crackdown. The contradiction would become increasingly difficult to explain away.

Beyond the current PoK crisis

It would be premature to see Pakistan's Kashmir policy unravelling. Pakistan retains both the institutional architecture and the political will to keep Kashmir central to its foreign policy. What appears to be changing is something more intangible but equally important. Its Kashmir narrative has begun to come part.

The narrative that sustained Pakistan's position for decades depended on the belief that Kashmiris naturally looked towards Pakistan as their advocate. That assumption no longer appears self-evident. When Kashmiris protest Pakistan's own administration, when parts of the diaspora demonstrate outside Pakistani missions and when the defence minister ends up describing Kashmiri protesters as "enemies like India", the old story begins to lose coherence.