Magnetic strongmen and their limits

On Sunday, voters in Hungary triggered a tectonic shift, signalling they had had enough of their country being turned into a 'Petri dish for illiberalism' by PM Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party. Orban's defeat not only stands out for its sheer scale but also serves as a stark reminder that the tide of populism does recede. Sixteen years of supermajority rule enabled the one-time liberal democrat to reshape the constitution in ways that entrenched his hold on power, making the electorate's verdict even more consequential.

Orban's defeat underscores a basic democratic truth, even in systems that drive towards illiberalism: the greatest failure of any political class is its inability to read the changing public mood. Whether the emphatic two-thirds victory for Peter Magyar and Tisza Party marks a durable return to liberal democracy remains to be seen. A former Orban loyalist, Magyar joined Tisza only in 2024, making the scale and speed of this shift striking.

There are broader lessons here for Orban's peers. 'Strongman magnetism' - almost always doused with nationalism and other atavistic ingredients - offers diminishing returns, particularly in societies that realise that bumper stickers and catchy slogans doth not alone good governance make. It becomes progressively harder to demonise 'outsiders' when economic realities require more attention than glorious promises. At some point, populist politics exhausts its supply of enemies. Voters, ultimately, are guided by more immediate concerns: economic stability, opportunity, living standards. When governments lose sight of these priorities, alienation follows. Populism can deliver, but only up to a point. Orban's case is a lesson others would do well to heed, even as they flex their muscles.