Is the Maoist call for truce with government a tactical move to blunt their security operations?

Is the sudden Maoist call for a truce and talks with the government a mere tactical move to blunt security operations in their strongholds, as well as stem wider operations that have, self-confessedly, hurt the Maoist top leadership? Or is it a fundamental realignment on the Maoist side?

For, if the Maoists, with their declared aim of overthrowing the state by force are now speaking of seeking legitimacy from that very state, it marks a massive shift! It goes without saying that recognition as “legitimately political” cannot be had for a movement that does not rule out or altogether give up armed struggle against the state.

So, hypothetically, were the Maoists to cease and desist from armed struggle as the primary means of achieving their aims, and adopt some form of — albeit in whatever revolutionary colour — legitimate political method, there could well be the possibility of a substantial change, including lifting of bans on frontal organisations.

Equally, the Indian state must remain aware that any gains — even perhaps forcing the Maoists to call for such talks — security operations have achieved are frittered away if tribals and the dispossessed continue to be made targets in the war against the Maoists or atrocities against them go unpunished.

Nothing, despite their own crimes, buttresses Maoist claims of the need for a violent agitation than indiscriminate reprisals by the state and its forces. We’ve had talk of a “twin-pronged” strategy of accelerated development and policing in Maoist-dominated areas.

Perhaps the Maoist “offer” of seeking recognition will open up a third space, on many fronts and in areas outside the active battle zones. But, yes, this is an “offer” one must be cautious about, but not dismissive — do not hesitate to call the bluff, if there is one.