Xi Jinping among pigeons

The global democracy combine meant to counter China is under stress, allowing Beijing the space to leverage differences to its advantage. It's a 'watch out' moment for big democracies like India and the US, which, in their election year, are faced with a heated domestic political environment that only adds to the complication.

The problem stems from within the loosely-termed 'coalition of democracies' that has taken shape over the past 5-6 years to work at ways to derisk from China. The agenda, by now, is also quite elaborate - from building alternate supply chains and curbing China's access to critical technology, to defence collaborations and exploring new geopolitical and economic arrangements.

So, where's the challenge? Mostly within, and among, democratic nations, which can be broadly understood across three parameters:

• Adjustment issues between Western liberal democracies and other democracies.
• Mutual suspicion among liberal democracies.
• Economic pressures arising from the reset with China.

This political collaboration rested on a broader conception of democracy, not just limited to the Western liberal frame. To quite an extent, this required Western democracies to adjust their outlook, given the nature of threat at hand. And this happened as the US built on the Quad, included India, and made a broader outreach across smaller democracies in the Indo-Pacific.

The challenge always was how to balance these strategically vital relationships - founded as a response to new geopolitical realities - with pressure groups within liberal democracies. That has proved difficult as some key decisions the US took betrayed a compromise somewhere.

For instance, the Biden administration took a call on a condition-less withdrawal from Afghanistan, which resulted in Taliban usurping power. This was confirmed by then-US special representative on Afghanistan reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, who struck the deal with Taliban, in his interview to the House Foreign Affairs Committee inquiring into US withdrawal.

This had a debilitating impact on the fledgling but democratically-elected government in Kabul. 'The US withdrawal had a psychological impact and negatively affected the relative balance of power for the government,' he conceded.

This was not the best signal to weaker democracies in the region, which was further complicated by the shadow games played in Pakistan. Eventually, Imran Khan was jailed, and the Sharif brothers found themselves in favour.

In Bangladesh, the yardstick was different. Despite Indian advice, the US, echoing Pakistani lobby groups in Washington, questioned the legitimacy of recent Bangladesh polls that saw Sheikh Hasina return to power. As a result, Beijing waded into troubled waters and invited her to visit China. She is considering the request seriously and may make a stopover in Delhi.

The fact is, weakening India's hand in South Asia is not in US interest. In some cases, it ends up helping China. In other words, the old idea of selective application of the liberal democratic frame disregarding interests of non-Western democracies may not only sit oddly with new realities, but could also prove counterproductive.

The second parameter of mutual suspicion among liberal democracies is best demonstrated in Europe. Here, a challenge is arising out of the big churn in US domestic politics, which has forced the major powers in the continent to set aside big defence and security budgets, particularly in the light of the Russia-Ukraine war.

According to the 2024 IMF World Economic Outlook, France, Germany and Italy are staring at less than 1% real GDP growth. This is not helped by the perception that the US has, in fact, gained from big gas deals with Europe as an alternative to Russia, as well as from a phenomenal increase in defence sales. The mutual suspicion has entered a realm of uncertainty amid prospects of a second Trump presidency.

China has used this opportunity to try and play itself back in Europe. Xi Jinping is currently on his first trip to Europe in five years, visiting France, Serbia and Hungary. He hopes to navigate the most difficult obstruction - the EU itself - in these conversations. In Budapest, Xi will show solidarity with Hungarian president Viktor Orban, whose 'Eastern Opening' strategy envisages greater cooperation with Beijing.

The third point on economic pressure is an interconnected one, visible in the reach-out from Germany, Italy and the Netherlands to China. Olaf Scholz was in Beijing recently. And while Italy has pulled out of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) last November, plans are afoot for big-ticket visits.

The Netherlands, home to MNC ASML, which has a virtual monopoly over advanced microchips production machines, is under economic pressure to ease restrictions on exporting these machines to China. Xi took this up strongly with Dutch PM Mark Rutte during his visit to China in March.

Interestingly, the Netherlands is still among the biggest importers from China in Europe. Along with Scholz, Rutte, too, is trying to walk the fine line between China and the US.

On a broader plane, however, what's clear is that what was seen as a big democracy partnership to counter China is on somewhat shaky footing now, largely due to insecurities caused from actions among and within democracies. The worry is that having waited it out on the margins and absorbed considerable pressure, China has now shifted gears to move in on democracies in doubt, if not in turmoil.