With US taking a hostile approach to India, the 'Mecca pact' is threatening

It may not be a 'Sunni Nato', but the latest Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Turkiye defence agreement should give India pause. Breezy commentary in India would seem to suggest that the pact is 'not aimed' at India, so we can exhale. There is a whiff of the Nato Article 5 'one for all, all for one' language in the agreement, but little details. It would, however, be folly to believe India would not be impacted. In fact, India's regional security environment just got a lot more uncertain.

The question running through security planners is whether an Indian response to a Pakistan-sponsored terror attack or any other aggression could trigger the mutual defence clause. Whether Riyadh or Ankara intervenes in a kinetic sense is debatable. But they can help out in many other ways. The three can combine their complementary strengths.

Saudi Arabia has finance reserves, sovereign wealth and vast energy resources. Turkiye has the second-largest military in Nato, and a thriving defence industry - both Islamabad and Riyadh are buyers of Turkish drones. Pakistan brings to the table a large, professional, battle-experienced military force, and nuclear weapons. One is looking at weapons and tech transfer flows, regardless of how the mutual-defence clause plays out in practice.


All three countries are close allies of the US and users of US military hardware. So, interoperability of systems is already built in. Also, Pakistan and Turkiye are close to China. So, this defence cooperation extending out isn't incomprehensible. Then there's the diplomatic assistance that Pakistan can call upon from all these partners.

Also, are Pakistan and Turkiye now a part of the Iran war? So far, Islamabad has kept its nose relatively clean. Despite the 2025 Pakistani-Saudi defence agreement, Pakistan has not actively fought the Houthis or Iran on behalf of Riyadh. Many in Pakistan expected Saudi assistance during its short conflict with Afghanistan. This did not happen. Pakistan has branded itself as a 'stabilising power', with its mediation efforts and active shuttle diplomacy. Asim Munir is the US' favourite field marshal, providing Pakistan a PoV in the Oval Office for the first time. Decades of being the 'exploitable frontier state' has given Pakistan leverage that's working for Rawalpindi.

The US has given its blessings to the 'Mecca agreement', which is a further realignment of geopolitical equations in the region. But complexities abound. Houthis are to Iran what Jaish-e-Mohammed is to Pakistan. Saudi Arabia will remain under Houthi threat, even after the Strait of Hormuz becomes active again.

If Tehran believes that the 'Mecca pact' is an anti-Shia front, it won't take much to 'activate' the Shia 'axis' against Saudi Arabia, which remains Iran's premier ideological opponent. That could light up the region again, including Pakistan.

The Levant has other vulnerabilities. For instance, Turkiye retains a 'rivalry without enmity' relationship with Iran. But the Kurds are an issue for both, although in different ways. Turkiye supports Muslim Brotherhood, which is problematic for Saudi Arabia. But Ankara offers opportunities that would be attractive to the other partners. In other words, the 'Mecca pact' is a bit like Forrest Gump's 'box of chocolates' - you never know what you're gonna get.

Saudi Arabia has got a nuclear deal with the US. Which basically means Iran will never relinquish nuclear ambitions. Saudis have refused to sign the Abraham Accords, which aligns with Pakistan and Turkiye. Whatever else happens, nuclear risk just shot up in the region.

The US war on Iran has entered a cycle. The Iran-Oman arrangement on Hormuz is stuck at the doorstep of US sanctions, frozen funds and naval blockade. The US is trying to stop Iran's crypto pathways. Iran believes the US could resume strikes after the November midterms, and the US has no way of preventing Iran from attacking commercial vessels or infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf states. The US military is reportedly looking for an off-ramp, because it recognises a military stalemate aggravated by depleted missile stocks. Iran has sustained massive damage. Both sides would like the war to end. But no one wants to blink.

New Delhi's response has been a scramble along three tracks: diversification, direct engagement with Tehran, and naval hedging. The US has become one of India's biggest defence sources, along with Russia (bilateral trade, centred on energy, is likely to touch $100 bn). With Iran, India had resumed direct oil buys, and in amounts that pleasantly surprised Tehran. India is realigning itself in the region, too. The India-UAE relationship will only deepen. India should invest more in the Qatar and Oman relationships - and should grow its naval presence in Oman's Duqm, for instance.

India remains dependent on the dollar system. So, it cannot be as opportunistic as, say, China. But a coherent, rational doctrine is currently in play. This includes protecting its own assets, avoiding entanglement in outcomes it doesn't control. At this point, GoI is running multi-alignment-as-risk management. That will have to continue for a while.

While it may be tough to build ties with Turkiye, Saudi Arabia is different. New Delhi has a growing economic relationship with Riyadh, running a considerable trade deficit that the latter may be reluctant to upend. That should continue, as a hedging practice.

Ultimately, the US relationship will matter. Washington is taking a determinedly hostile approach to India. That also makes the Mecca pact more unstable and threatening.