Will RSS be NDA's 10 Janpath?

Ever since BJP won the 16th general election, there has been much travel between RSS headquarters in the Delhi district of Jhandewalan and the houses of senior BJP leaders. This has led to critics questioning the role of RSS. Some wonder if it will become an extra-constitutional authority for the NDA government — quite like 10 Janpath or the National Advisory Council was for the UPA government. Those with long memories have recalled RSS pressure on the earlier NDA government (1998-2004).
How valid are these concerns? It would be best to avoid a quick and pat analysis. Conditions have changed (since 1998 or even 2004), personalities have changed and history will not repeat itself just because commentators want it to.

RSS is a critical stakeholder in BJP. It is not the only stakeholder; there are other influences and streams in BJP that have emerged from outside the Sangh Parivar. Nevertheless RSS provides a robust social network that BJP has tapped into. Take the election campaign in Uttar Pradesh, where BJP and its allies won 73 of 80 seats. Journalists covering the election stressed RSS involvement in canvassing and grassroots mobilisation was possibly at its highest since 1977.

This may well be true, but the reasons were practical and down to earth. In 1977, the Jana Sangh and/or the Janata Party were handicapped by the fact that formal politics had been banned in India during the Emergency. As such there were no party offices and workers available. The Sangh network, which had played a big role in opposing the Emergency, just had to step in.

In 2014 in Uttar Pradesh, the BJP had a winning product — Narendra Modi — but no infrastructure to promote that product. When Amit Shah, BJP general secretary, came to take charge of the state, he found the BJP organisation was far removed from the energetic party of the 1990s. Uttar Pradesh has 1,24,000 polling booths. BJP was optimally functional in only 8%.

Given this Shah, Modi and BJP had to turn to activists in RSS frontal organisations. It must be realised this is not how BJP usually fights elections. It is not as if RSS workers come in and help in such a manner each time the party seeks votes. RSS and BJP concerns and motivations don't always agree. In 2014, however, there was absolute agreement on Modi's candidature. As such when the RSS network was asked to back the BJP campaign, it did so enthusiastically.

Modi's relationship with RSS is complex. In Gujarat, he has had differences with Sangh units and guarded the political autonomy of the government and the party. Having said that, he is very much a creature of RSS and draws inspiration from its broader vision of a resurgent India.

Till 30 years ago, Modi was a full-time RSS man. Many of his contemporaries are in senior positions in the Sangh now. There are old associations and webs of relationships — even occasional rivalries — that are not easily decipherable to an outsider, including to others in BJP. Modi knows RSS and its workings, he knows which buttons to press and when to back down, better than almost any other BJP functionary. On its part, RSS sees him as its most distinguished alumnus. There is genuine goodwill for the pracharak who made it in politics and became a pan-Indian mass leader.

Modi's intimate and inner knowledge of RSS can be viewed as a threat by some. Yes, he can represent the Sangh's greatest challenge. Equally, he can be seen as the Sangh's most accomplished product. Analysts may prefer a black or white choice. Reality is far more nuanced. Modi's ability to take along RSS even when he disagrees with it — and no doubt disagreements will arise — should not be discounted.

In the late 1990s, when Atal Bihari Vajpayee and L K Advani took charge of the NDA government, RSS and BJP were relatively inexperienced in the sphere of governance. Not a single BJP government had completed a full term, though the then state governments of Rajasthan and Delhi were in their fifth year. A lot of lessons have been learnt in the intervening period, from the NDA-I phase as well as from the several, multi-term state governments BJP has run. That is why to expect that RSS and BJP will make exactly the same errors and take exactly the same false steps they may have in 1998 is unrealistic.

There is also a generational issue. Shortly after the Vajpayee government took over Rajendra Singh (or Rajju Bhaiya), a mentor figure for Vajpayee and Advani, stepped down as RSS chief. He made way for the much younger K S Sudarshan. Equations did become strained at this point. Today, however, Modi and the current troika running RSS — sarsanghchalak Mohan Bhagwat, general secretary Bhaiyyaji Joshi and Suresh Soni — are of similar age and the same peer group.

Most important, RSS leaders are acutely aware of the context of Modi's mandate. They realise too that if he is given the space to be successful, he — and BJP — could be in power for a sustained period. This pragmatic understanding could actually lead to an easier RSS-government relationship than pessimists predict.

The writer is a political commentator.