Land of the feudal lords

It is perhaps a measure of the despairing attitude of even the most ardent votaries of democracy, when it comes to Pakistan, that periodically they find themselves pondering the relative merits army rule might offer in that country.

That such bouts of dysfunctional and stymied democratic interludes and military intervention have not merely added to the deepening of the rot in Pakistan is not in doubt. Nonetheless, current events once again seem to be building up to yet another denouement where the army might once again be seen as the least and most preferable of the evils next door.

And given the fact that, this time around, there were post-Musharraf hopes of a grand democratic renaissance, and even embryonic signs that Pakistan���s feudal and feuding political elite might just go beyond the merely symbolic in fulfilling the overwhelming popular mandate for civilian leadership and stability, the situation threatening to turn over yet again can only be ascribed, at its root, to the fundamentally flawed nature of Pakistan���s polity, and consequently, the utter failure of its political class.

The genesis of that historic failure goes back to the creation of Pakistan and, the new nation, despite the vast number of foot-soldiers coming from the lower classes and the peasantry, becoming the preserve of the old feudal land-owning elite. Which, by now, has somewhat enlarged to encompass the proverbial 100-odd families that comprise the overwhelming majority of the elite in almost all spheres of the state ��� be it the political class, the military, industry or the bureaucracy.

Such a fundamentally unreformed social order has meant that the structural weaknesses, which breed inequity and regressive socio-political tendencies, despite regimes of various hues being in charge at various points in history, have remained almost wholly unaddressed. Central to this, for example, is the question of land distribution and ownership.

Given the lack of effective land reform, the position of countless tenant farmers and agricultural labourers has remained one of virtual serfdom to the landed elites. Not surprisingly, there are reportedly almost 2 million bonded labourers, largely in the agricultural sector, all over Pakistan. And it is the landed elites, the Sardars of Baluchistan, the Khans of the NWFP or the Chaudharys and Waderas of the Punjab and Sind who comprise the most powerful regressive political class.

Despite the emergence of proto-progressive forces in Pakistan���s interrupted democratic history, such as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto���s PPP, the ANP in the NWFP, or, even with its problematic ethno-nationalism, the MQM in Sindh ��� and the latter, even while riddled with the same malaise that afflicts the other political parties in Pakistan, can still lay claim to being the only non-feudal, middle-class based party ��� the basic skewed nature of the polity and the stranglehold of the rent-seeking elites on power configurations has meant an inability to deliver on any meaningful reform.

This has, in turn, meant that even the ���establishment��� remains a mutated entity, unable even to perform some basic state functions ��� for example, the state has never been able to even fully spread its taxation net in the face of stiff opposition from its own allied, entrenched interests. And given that feudal political structure, politics in Pakistan has rarely moved beyond the envisioning of state power as a family fief, with the attendant preoccupation with grabbing and consolidating political power even by gerrymandering the state and constitutional framework.

The personality-driven political landscape this has fashioned, as is the case now, means that there has emerged a massive disconnect between the people and the political class. With exacerbated inequity, the struggle for the crumbs of power between various groups took the form of intense regional and ethnic clashes, further dividing the polity.

Externally, it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent war, which practically made Pakistan a military base, and its dovetailing with General Zia���s Islamisation campaign, which inaugurated the current levels of Islamic extremism in Pakistan. Islamisation stepped in where the state had never penetrated, and vast sections of the poor and marginalised, in effect, were weaned on a conception of agency articulated through, and by, political Islam.

This partly explains why, despite the staggering challenge of sweeping Islamic militancy Pakistan faces today, vast sections of the population remain either apathetic or even sympathetic to the idea of Islamisation. And the political class, perhaps now more than ever, is failing to counter this challenge given its own inherent disconnect and preoccupation with jockeying for and consolidating state power.

Given current events, the dilemma some sections within the country, and certainly those outside Pakistan, may soon once again face is whether the seemingly hopeless undermining of democratic institutions, and the apparent free fall of the country, can ever be reversed. And, in a literal tautology, the army may once again be seen as at least offering the best interim hope of restoring some method within the anarchy.