India's Menage a Trois: Graham Act puts New Delhi's strategic autonomy to test

The US Senate's overwhelming passage of the Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act is not merely another escalation in Washington's campaign against Moscow. It marks a more consequential shift: the attempt to make third countries pay an economic price for continuing to trade with Russia. For India, this is a warning.

The legislation will authorise Trump to impose tariffs of up to 100% on goods from the largest purchasers of Russian crude oil and natural gas, as well as countries facilitating sanctions evasion. The bill still has to clear the House and receive presidential assent. Its eventual impact will, therefore, depend heavily on how Washington chooses to exercise the considerable discretion built into it.

Also read: US Senate passes sweeping Russia sanctions bill; new tariff threat for India, China ahead


So, how should India protect its energy security without allowing its relationship with Washington to become hostage to its relationship with Moscow? The answer will require diplomacy, diversification and strategic clarity.

The logic behind the legislation is straightforward. Western sanctions have constrained Russia. But they have not prevented Moscow from selling large quantities of oil and gas to alternative markets. India and China have become particularly important destinations for Russian energy. Washington's response is to widen the battlefield.

It gives Trump the power to impose punitive tariffs on major purchasers of Russian energy. Yet, there is a fundamental problem with this approach. Energy markets are not easily redesigned through political decree. Russia has already adapted to Western restrictions by redirecting exports, developing alternative shipping networks and cultivating non-Western financial arrangements. If sanctions become more aggressive, Russia may be forced to offer deeper discounts.

The underlying demand for relatively cheap energy is unlikely to disappear. The geography of global energy trade may change without necessarily producing the strategic outcome Washington seeks.

India's purchases of Russian crude have been driven primarily by energy security and economics. Availability of discounted Russian oil has benefited Indian refiners and consumers at a time of considerable volatility in global energy markets.

This position is unlikely to change. At the same time, India cannot ignore the importance of the US. Washington is a critical partner in defence, technology, supply chains and the Indo-Pacific. This produces the central contradiction. India needs Russian energy. But it also needs US partnership. The answer can't be to sacrifice one relationship for the other.

The bill does not automatically impose a 100% tariff on Indian goods. It provides Trump with authority to impose such tariffs. That distinction creates space for diplomacy. The US has substantial leverage because India exports pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, textiles, chemicals, auto components and other products to the US market. A broad tariff regime could impose significant costs on Indian businesses and complicate ongoing trade negotiations.

Also read: 100% tariff threat looms over India as US senate passes Russia sanctions bill

The US wants India to play a larger role in its Indo-Pacific strategy. It wants Indian participation in supply-chain diversification, defence manufacturing, tech cooperation and efforts to reduce dependence on China. Punishing India too aggressively over Russian oil could become strategically self-defeating.

The current debate also raises a larger question about Indian foreign policy. Strategic autonomy is sometimes caricatured as fence-sitting. It isn't. For India, it means retaining the capacity to make independent choices in pursuit of national interests. It allows New Delhi to deepen its partnership with Washington without becoming a US ally; maintain ties with Moscow without endorsing all of its policies; compete with Beijing while engaging it economically; and work with Europe, Japan, the Gulf and the 'global south' simultaneously.

This flexibility has become more valuable as the international system becomes increasingly fragmented. The Russia sanctions debate is, therefore, not simply about oil, but about who gets to determine India's strategic choices. India should respond by reducing its vulnerability rather than surrendering its autonomy.

Greater diversification of energy suppliers, increased domestic production and renewables, expanded purchases from alternative markets - including the US - and stronger economic resilience can gradually reduce dependence on any single supplier. This diversification should be driven by Indian interests, not imposed as a condition of partnership.

There is another reason for Washington to think carefully. China, like India, is a major purchaser of Russian energy. If the US increasingly uses secondary tariffs to force countries to reduce Russian imports, it may unintentionally encourage Beijing and Moscow to deepen their economic relationship. More broadly, aggressive secondary sanctions could accelerate creation of parallel financial, energy and trading networks outside the Western system.

The Graham Act should, therefore, be seen as a test of the maturity of India-US relations rather than as an inevitable crisis. India should continue to engage Washington at the highest level, make clear the economic logic behind its energy choices, and seek exemptions or waivers where necessary. At the same time, it should accelerate energy diversification so that future geopolitical shocks don't leave it exposed.

The writer is professor of international relations, King's College London