India-China thaw: Engagement returns, but strategic trust stays elusive

Xi Jinping's visit to New Delhi for the BRICS summit - his first visit to India in 7 years - marked an important, if carefully calibrated, moment in India-China relations. The important point is that neither side has abandoned its assessment of the other. Rather, both are attempting to establish mechanisms through which competition can be managed without escalating into crisis.

The language surrounding the Modi-Xi meeting in Delhi is revealing. Both argued that India and China should regard each other as partners, not rivals. The central proposition: differences should not become disputes.

For Xi, this reflects Beijing's interest in stabilising its external environment amid trade and supply-chain uncertainty, tensions with the US and regional instability. So, he stressed calibrating perceptions, leveraging each country's strengths, supporting each other's BRICS presidencies and coordinating in institutions such as the UN, SCO and G20. His call for India and China to remain 'good neighbours and friends' signals Beijing's preference for managing differences while preserving space for cooperation.


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Modi, however, framed the relationship around India's established principles of mutual respect, sensitivity and interest. His call for a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable boundary settlement underscored that economic and multilateral cooperation cannot indefinitely substitute for progress on LAC.

India's reaffirmation of its positions on Taiwan and Tibet, along with its assurance that its territory would not be used for anti-China activities, signalled reassurance. New Delhi appears willing to acknowledge Chinese sensitivities but expects reciprocal restraint and stability from Beijing.

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The visit offers reasons for cautious optimism.

Diplomatic normalisation: Xi's return to India, the ceremonial welcome and renewed leader-level dialogue represent evidence that, since Galwan, the two sides are moving away from diplomatic paralysis. Regular political contact can create channels for managing future crises.

Economic opportunity: India cannot insulate its growth trajectory from China. Greater trade, investment and people-to-people contacts could ease some of the frictions. But progress will depend on Beijing addressing Indian concerns over market access, investment restrictions and the trade imbalance.

Selective cooperation: Uncertainty surrounding US trade policy, tensions in West Asia and vulnerabilities in global supply chains provide areas where Indian and Chinese interests may overlap. Such cooperation reflects pragmatic alignment where interests coincide.

The BRICS framework gives India and China a space for engagement without requiring alignment on the broader international order. India wants BRICS to remain a broad 'global south' platform while China is more willing to use it to challenge the West. Their approaches differ, but BRICS engagement serves both.

Limits of the rapprochement are critical.

The core boundary dispute remains unresolved, military deployments and infra development continue, and strategic mistrust has not disappeared. India and China compete across the Indo-Pacific, technology, the 'global south' and the neighbourhood.

India remains concerned about excessive dependence on Chinese supply chains and tech. Security considerations will continue to shape economic policy.

Differences over BRICS reflect a larger strategic divergence. India seeks a multipolar order that allows it to work simultaneously with the US, Russia, China and other partners. China seeks an international environment less dominated by the US. These competing visions will constrain the depth of cooperation.

The thaw should be understood as managed competition rather than reconciliation. Both have recognised that uncontrolled deterioration carries high costs, but neither has altered its strategic posture.

Xi's visit is best seen as a milestone in the post-Galwan stabilisation process, not as a reset of ties. For durability, 3 factors will be key: sustained peace along LAC, progress on economic and people-to-people ties and continued political engagement.

India and China are unlikely to become close strategic partners very soon. New Delhi's objective should not be to eliminate competition with Beijing but to ensure that competition remains bounded, predictable and manageable.

The present moment is best described as stabilisation without strategic trust, engagement without reconciliation and cooperation without convergence.