IAF needs to spread its wings: Is the declining squadron strength in the IAF a sign of deeper systemic issues?

Last Saturday, ahead of Air Force Day on October 8, Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Amar Preet Singh flagged a familiar concern: 'declining squadron strength'. This has been a recurring theme in the parliamentary standing committee on defence.

'Declining squadron strength' in IAF's language is measured as the quantum of combat aircraft that can be deployed at air bases across the country, particularly against India's two perennial adversaries, Pakistan and China. The issue has become more acute with retirement of the old warhorse, MiG-21. The Soviet-designed fighter had been phased out over several years, so the writing was on the wall.

Yet, instead of a well-scheduled fighter induction and de-induction programme, the latter happened while the former stuttered along. As Air Chief Marshal Singh put it, 'technology delayed is technology denied'. There is, however, a caveat.


IAF has always projected an ideal squadron strength of 42 fixed-wing combat aircraft worth of hardware. This has been the figure since the late-1980s. Put aside various technologies that have come up since then - from the internet, military-compatible satellite imagery, smartphones, and UAVs to AI. National security threats have undergone an equally profound change.

Civilian and military bureaucracies, however, can come up with points to challenge arguments over technology and change, mass or quality. So, it would be possible to justify 42 squadrons even in a new technology era, and it would be churlish to hold that against IAF.

The second part of the caveat, nonetheless, holds IAF jointly responsible for the declining numbers of combat squadrons. Its partner in these plummeting numbers is its bete noire, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Both are responsible for this situation, although in different ways, over differing time periods. The tale is old and needs a recap.

Just as India was the first Asian country to become a nuclear power, it was also the first to design, develop and manufacture a combat jet aircraft. Hindustan Fighter HF-24 had, by all accounts, a superlative airframe, but an underpowered engine. Instead of developing successive variants, as is being done now with Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA), the HF-24 programme was abandoned. Neither the richest nor the most socialist economies would do what India did. Yet, a decade later, in the late 1980s, India restarted, from point zero. Full funding began in 1993, after economic liberalisation had settled in.

Tejas' first flight on Jan 4, 2001, was a feather in the cap of Indian military aviation. Yet, 25 yrs on, if India has been unable to adequately re-equip the squadrons phasing out MiG-21s with Tejas, something is clearly amiss.

HAL has missed manufacturing timelines and frequently blames IAF for repeatedly altering Air Staff Qualitative Requirements, the benchmarks for designing and developing combat aircraft. Each accuses the other of failing along the way. Expanding private production of Tejas is the obvious way out.

HAL's production lines cannot hope to manufacture the 36-40 combat aircraft a year demanded by CAS. New private production lines are, therefore, the only way out of this quagmire. The situation has also created a piquant imbalance in IAF, which now flies as many combat jets as helicopters. Combat aircraft draw the eyeballs, while slower but equally vital helicopters deliver in inhospitable environments, alongside small and medium-lift transport aircraft. It is a reminder that IAF is not just about jet fighters but a diverse mix of capabilities.

CAS also lamented the 'slow induction' of pilots, which is curious, since this is largely an internal service matter. Creating vacancies and finding the right candidates are service prerogatives. Which, then, begs the question about IAF's leadership selection, confined as it is largely within the fighter ranks. Such 'casteism' is unhealthy, particularly when it concerns military ranks. Leadership talent exists across combat fields, and in IAF, it covers fighters, transports and helicopters alike.

US Air Force (USAF), the global benchmark for air forces, has itself been led by several bomber pilots. It's a curious case that USAF and IAF are not too dissimilar in the percentage of combat aircraft flown, although the numbers are vastly disparate. What differentiates the two services is the percentage of trainer aircraft, with USAF holding an extraordinarily high number. So, CAS' other lament has a solution too.