Five years of Taliban rule: Survival is not the same as stability

On 15 August 2026, the Taliban will complete five years in power since its return to Kabul in 2021. For a movement that many expected either to fragment or fail under the pressure of governing Afghanistan, its endurance is significant for national governance and regional security. Five years later, it remains in control of almost the entire country, while armed resistance forces appear too weak and fragmented to pose a serious challenge to its authority. The Taliban has therefore demonstrated its ability to retain power; the larger question, however, is whether it can translate that control into sustainable, inclusive and economically viable governance.

Mounting Domestic Pressures

The Taliban’s sixth year in office begins at a difficult moment. Its most immediate challenge is domestic. Afghanistan’s already fragile economy remains under severe pressure from poverty, unemployment, food insecurity and the large-scale return of Afghan refugees from neighbouring countries. According to the UN, 14 million Afghans face acute hunger, while child malnutrition has reached record levels in 12 provinces. The UN World Food Programme has stated that one in three Afghans is now in the grip of acute food insecurity, while resources remain inadequate to contain this deepening crisis. The return of over five million Afghans from Pakistan and Iran since 2023 has further strained livelihoods, public services and social stability. Now the prospect of EU countries deporting Afghan refugees, amid closed-door migration talks with the Taliban held in Brussels this year, could worsen the country’s humanitarian crisis.

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This humanitarian pressure is not merely an economic concern; it is also a governance test. A regime that claims to have restored order must demonstrate whether it can absorb returning populations, generate livelihoods and prevent further social distress. If it fails, the Taliban’s territorial control may remain intact, but its ability to claim legitimacy among ordinary Afghans could weaken. Moreover, growing environmental stresses including water scarcity, drought, floods and other climate-related challenges are adding another layer of vulnerability to the country’s socioeconomic situation.

A second challenge comes from within the Taliban itself. The movement has so far avoided open fragmentation that many observers predicted in 2021. However, reports of internal tensions, particularly over resources, governance styles and political authority, point to underlying strains. Competition over Afghanistan’s reportedly trillion-dollar untapped mineral resources has triggered clashes between Taliban factions, including disputes over control of mining sites. In February this year, for instance, armed clashes broke out between rival Taliban factions in Afghanistan’s northeastern Badakhshan province over control of a Gold Mine.

Competing visions for Afghanistan have also intensified internal tensions within the Taliban. One power centre, associated with Kandahar and the supreme leader, favours a rigid and isolated Islamic Emirate, while another, largely based in Kabul, remains conservative but more open to external engagement and economic pragmatism. This divide became visible last September when the Emir reportedly ordered an internet/phone shutdown, only for services to be restored within three days by the Kabul faction. The Taliban also faces strains from dissatisfied local commanders such as Juma Khan Fateh in Badakhshan, Pashtun factional rivalries and resentment over Kandahar’s concentration of power, raising concerns about their long-term internal cohesion.

However, women’s rights remain one of the Taliban’s most visible sources of domestic/international criticism. Restrictions on girls’ education, women’s mobility and basic freedoms have deepened Afghanistan’s isolation. Yet small-scale entrepreneurship has become one of the few remaining spaces where Afghan women can attempt to sustain livelihoods. According to the International Crisis Group, licences granted to women-led enterprises have quadrupled to over 10,000 since 2021, while tens of thousands more women operate informal businesses. This is a positive development, but it should not be mistaken for meaningful empowerment, as women continue to face severe restrictions in education, employment and public life.

Security Under Strain

The security situation presents a more complex picture. Compared with the pre-2021 period, nationwide armed conflict has declined as the Taliban has consolidated territorial control and weakened organised armed opposition. Yet Afghanistan remains far from secure. Badakhshan, Herat, Nangarhar, Kunduz, Faryab, Helmand, Kandahar and a few other provinces have witnessed recent attacks by anti-Taliban groups such as Sipahiyan-e Mihan, the National Resistance Front, the Afghanistan Freedom Front and the Afghanistan United Front. These groups have sought to capitalise on ethnic tensions, resource disputes and local grievances against the regime. The Taliban’s ban on poppy cultivation has also alienated farmers who lost an important source of income, making areas such as Badakhshan, Kunduz fertile ground for anti-Taliban sentiment.

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Meanwhile, ISKP remains a major threat, mainly concentrated in Afghanistan’s north and northeast, while renewed conflict with Pakistan has caused civilian casualties and border instability. Thus, despite reduced nationwide conflict, Afghanistan remains vulnerable to cross-border tensions, militant violence and internal unrest.

Taliban’s External Engagements

Foreign policy has been the Taliban’s strongest front. Despite limited international recognition, with Russia remaining the only country to officially recognise the regime, Kabul has expanded its engagement with neighbouring/regional actors, including the Central Asian republics, Russia, Iran and China, to varying degrees. This year, the first Afghanistan–Central Asia Consultative Dialogue and the Afghanistan–Central Asia Think Tank Forum were held in Kabul, signalling efforts to institutionalise ties with Central Asia and strengthen regional cooperation. Last May, Russia and Afghanistan also signed a military-technical cooperation agreement, marking their deepest security engagement and broadening relations beyond diplomacy, trade and recognition.

This outreach is partly driven by the Taliban’s worsening ties with Pakistan and the ongoing West Asian crisis—the latter making Iranian routes increasingly volatile and trade diversification more urgent. Projects such as the Trans-Afghan Transport Corridor, TAPI and CASA-1000 are therefore crucial for landlocked Afghanistan’s economic recovery and for strengthening its connectivity with Central Asia and beyond.

Pakistan, however, remains a major exception in the Taliban’s regional diplomacy. Kabul–Islamabad ties have deteriorated sharply over the TTP, cross-border attacks, border closures and military actions. A relationship once expected in Pakistan to be strategically advantageous has instead become increasingly adversarial. In February 2026, Pakistan declared “open war” with Afghanistan after the TTP allegedly orchestrated over 1,000 attacks in 2025 from Afghan sanctuaries. Islamabad subsequently launched “Operation Ghazab Lil Haq,” carrying out unprecedented airstrikes, including a controversial strike on a drug rehabilitation centre in Kabul that reportedly killed hundreds. Afghanistan retaliated with its own military campaign, “Operation Radd al-Zulm.”

Despite Chinese-mediated talks in Urumqi and Beijing’s Special Envoy’s shuttle diplomacy, hostilities persist between Kabul and Islamabad. The crisis has also complicated China’s plans to extend CPEC and secure mineral deals in Afghanistan. Moreover, this confrontation has imposed serious economic and security costs on Afghanistan, with civilians suffering from casualties, trade disruptions and livelihood insecurities.

India’s Calibrated Engagement

India–Afghanistan relations have deepened since the Taliban foreign minister’s visit to New Delhi in October 2025, after which India handed over the Afghan embassy in Delhi to Taliban-appointed representatives and upgraded its diplomatic mission in Kabul. This was followed by visits from the Taliban’s Industry and Commerce Minister in November, Public Health Minister in December, and Agriculture Minister in July 2026. For India, the Taliban’s fifth anniversary reinforces the importance of calibrated engagement without formal recognition. New Delhi’s approach remains focused on humanitarian assistance, development outreach, people-to-people ties while preserving its strategic space in Afghanistan. This engagement also helps India navigate shifting regional dynamics and broader geopolitical recalibrations. The Union Budget 2026–27 reflected this approach by increasing development assistance to Afghanistan to Rs 150 crore.

The Road Ahead

Five years after its return to power, the Taliban has survived, consolidated and adapted. But survival is not the same as stability. The regime faces mounting humanitarian pressures, internal factionalism, economic fragility, restrictions on women, environmental vulnerabilities and a worsening confrontation with Pakistan. Its diplomatic outreach has given it room to manoeuvre, but it has not solved Afghanistan’s deeper governance crisis.

For India, Afghanistan under the Taliban is neither a space to abandon nor a regime to embrace uncritically. New Delhi’s approach should therefore rest on cautious engagement, sustained humanitarian support and strategic patience. As the Taliban enters its sixth year in power, the central question is not whether it can remain in Kabul, but whether it can build a functioning Afghanistan and whether regional actors, including India, can shape outcomes without compromising their core principles while engaging with the regime.

Dr. Anchita Borthakur is a Senior Research Associate at the Chintan Research Foundation.