Why working the caste math won’t help in winning Bihar polls

Now that Bihar has gone to the polls, experts are once again arguing its outcome in terms of caste. But do castes really count for that much in elections? What hard evidence do we have to presume such a relationship, even in Bihar?

In order to analyse this issue empirically, and not anecdotally, we have no choice but to rely on the 1931 census, as this was the last time when castes were actually listed. After Independence, it has been the accepted practice not to mention specific caste names but to bunch them as OBCs, SCs and Others. This is why the 1931 census is our primary data base. In intervening years the numbers have of course changed, but population proportions of communities have not altered by much.

Now, if we were to superimpose this caste data on our existing election constituencies, a surprising conclusion awaits us. In almost all instances, there is not a single caste that makes for more than 20% of the population, that too at a stretch. Generally, the strongest numerical showing of a caste is between 10-15%.

Let us now take this insight to Bihar, where caste supposedly determines elections. And, to make matters more difficult, and more convincing, why don’t we examine elections of the 1990s, a decade when caste politics were reportedly at their height in Bihar.
Once we do that, what do we find?

The first conclusion is that not even Yadavs (assuming they vote as a herd) can win an election on their own. In almost every constituency in Bihar, where their supposed electoral influence matters, they constitute no more than 10-15% of the population. If it is numbers such as these that allowed RJD/JD to win consistently in Gopalganj, Hajipur, Vaishali and Muzaffarpur, then why was their record not equally impressive in Balia, Motihari and Bettiah?

However, when Yadavs are 15-20% strong RJD/JD perform consistently better, as in Madhepur, Arrah, Monghyr. But even this picture is not entirely true. With the same Yadav population these parties had a variable record in the 1990s in Nevada, Chapra and Jehanabad (which once elected a communist).

Obviously, other castes are not sitting on their hands and are out there voting too. Therefore, fidelity to a single caste is not enough, notwithstanding our first-past-the-post election system. Even so, what remains a puzzle is why did RJD win so often in the 1990s? Why did the remaining population, with their varied caste identities, still rally behind this Yadav led party? It may be argued that there are some identity affinities between certain castes, especially among the earthy, agrarian ones. Persuasive as it may sound, this statement is empirically false.

Far from some castes being natural allies, what happens instead is that those of near equal status, in the same geographical region, are one another’s most hated rivals. This is as true for Yadavs and Kurmis of Bihar as it is of Jats and Gujjars in West UP. Even hookah sharing does not happen between these self-defined foes.

It is this observation that led sociologists to insist that there is mutual hostility, even “repulsion”, between different castes. Factually, then, it is incorrect to imagine that certain castes spontaneously call out to others on a broadly shared identity bandwidth.

Yet, on occasions, people of different castes do come together, as the peasant castes of UP and Bihar did, most spectacularly in the 1990s. When something like that happens, rather than searching for internalised caste based affinities, it is better to look at the external factors that bring about such alliances. For example, in the heydays of the Mandal period, the OBCs banded together because they all aspired for urban jobs and seats in educational institutions. This unity was not because their identities overlapped, but because their worldly interests did.

As these alliances are contextual, castes frequently fall out when circumstances change and new alliances are born. Consequently, no one party wins every election; in fact, all too often, a victor soon becomes the vanquished. There have actually been several instances when there is open warfare between castes that were once friends. This outcome can fox caste leaders too.

Let us return to our census numbers. If there is no single caste that numerically dominates any constituency, what are the options open to ordinary electorates? As the most numerous caste barely ever crosses the 20% mark anywhere, the voting population in that constituency will comprise at least four other communities. Now if there are two major contenders, as is normally the case, and as nobody wants to waste his or her vote, even hard core traditionalists have little option. They must, necessarily, overcome their instinctive “mutual repulsion” and vote for somebody from another caste. How difficult is that conclusion?

A similar picture emerges in other elections too. For example, Mayawati’s BSP won in areas in 2002 which she lost in 2007, and vice versa. Stunningly, in Sonbhadra district, with a majority SC population, BSP lost heavily in 2002, but won resoundingly in 2007. In West UP where SC numbers are low, BSP predictably lost in 2002 but unpredictably won in 2007.

Kindly stated, the relationship between caste and election results is untestable. On the other hand, bluntly put, the fault lies in our experts and not in our castes!