Political Islam, the Italian left and the battle for Italy's streets

The Youssef Siher affair, two contested mosque projects and the approaching 2027 elections raise a larger question about the political alliances taking shape around Italy's pro-Palestinian movement.

Until recently, Youssef Siher was a relatively little-known researcher and activist of Moroccan origin. On the surface Sihar was a success story, born in Italy of Moroccan parents, Sihar was a successful student and well integrated: co-founding the Muslim Students' Association at the University of Milan in 2018 as its first president. He also completed a Masters degree in Political Science and Government with a thesis that examined Islamist political movements in Morocco and their relationship with the Moroccan monarchy, including the relationship between twentieth-century political-Islam ideologies and earlier Islamic political traditions. He graduted with the best possible grade and honors.

By the end of October, the 30-year-old had become the subject of a national controversy involving Italy's intelligence services, the Interior Ministry and the judiciary including the Prime Minister.


Siher was identified by investigators as an administrator of the Movimento 17 Ottobre, an online movement that emerged following the violent demonstrations in Milan. His arrest on 24 October prompted allegations of incitement and questions about the organisations with which he was associated. A Milan judge subsequently ordered his release, finding that the evidence did not establish that he had encouraged the violence attributed to the movement. Prime Minister Meloni publicly criticised the decision.

Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi identified Siher as a promoter of Organizzazione Alba Nascente, a not-for-profitwhose positions he described as very close to those of the Muslim Brotherhood. Investigators in Genoa are also examining possible connections between Siher and individuals involved in the alleged financing of Hamas through networks associated with Mohammad Hannoun. Theattention of the security services to the intersection between political Islam and recent radical protest movements raises questions that extend beyond one individual, especially as Italy heads into an election year.

The Muslim Brotherhood has historically sought political influence through religious associations, educational institutions, community organisations and participation in public life. Its branches and associated movements differ considerably across countries.

In Italy, the question is whether parts of this wider political-Islam milieu are finding common ground with sections of the opposition and the radical left through the Palestinian causeand ultimately resulting in protests and violence on the streets in order to discredit the government as it heads into a general election.

The relationship is not an obvious ideological marriage. Yet the left and political Islam share immediate political objectives, particularly opposition to Israel's military operations, Western foreign policy and governments of the right perceived as hostile to their respective constituencies.

Italy's pro-Palestinian demonstrations have brought together student movements, trade unions, social centres, Palestinian associations and Muslim community activists which have made common cause with the political left. Their participation in the same demonstrations does not make them a single organisation. It does, however, create opportunities for political cooperation and for individual actors to move between otherwise separate networks.

The controversies surrounding two proposed mosques illustrate how these tensions are now entering Italian domestic politics. In Turin, Fratelli d'Italia has mounted a campaign against the proposed transformation of the former Nebiolo foundry into a large mosque and cultural centre. The project, promoted by the Confederazione Islamica Italiana, would receive funding from Morocco, including through the Moroccan state's religious institutions.

Maurizio Marrone, the Fratelli d'Italia vice-president of the Piedmont region, has proposed legislative measures intended to prevent the project from proceeding. Together with parliamentarian Augusta Montaruli, he participated in an October demonstration against the development. On the opposite side of the street, supporters of the mosque responded with Bella Ciao, the song associated with Italy's anti-fascist tradition.

The protest captured a remarkable political contrast. A religious construction project financed partly by the Moroccan monarchy had become a confrontation between Italy's governing right and demonstrators invoking the symbolism of the Italian left.

A similar dispute has developed in Mestre, near Venice, where a Bangladeshi Muslim association has sought permission to construct a large Islamic centre on land purchased in Via Giustizia.

The centre-right municipal administration, led by Mayor Simone Venturini, has refused to approve the necessary change of land use. The mayor has argued that the conditions for the project, including those concerning integration of the orthodox Bangladeshi muslim community, have not been met.

Taken together, Milan, Turin and Mestre reveal three different developments. The Siher affair concerns the possible intersection of political-Islam activism and radical mobilisation. Turin concerns foreign-funded religious infrastructure and its political opposition. Mestre concerns the growing capacity of organised immigrant communities to negotiate with local authorities, including through the possibility of collective economic action. All have Islamic extremism in common and could have links to the Islamic brotherhood egged on by state and non state actors.

Italy is approaching the 2027 general election. The opposition which consists of the Democratic Party, Five Star Movement and Green and Left Alliance have already begun discussions on a common political programme and leadership selection. Meanwhile, the Palestinian question has become an important source of mobilisation for parts of the Italian left, particularly among students and younger activists.

Despite different objectives, it would be mistaken to dismiss the possibility that politically sophisticated actors may seek to use large protest movements to expand their influence.

Italy's next election will be fought over familiar concerns, including wages, employment, taxation, migration, public services and security. It also does not mean that all is well, Italy stands at a precipice of its identity, its youth are concerned about opportunities and rising prices due to war have increased poverty with globalization eroding jobs and local companies. But it will also take place in a political environment in which the Middle East conflict, religious identity and questions of integration have acquired a stronger domestic dimension.

The Youssef Siher affair may be the tip of the ice-berg. It has similarties with protests in France and Spain, both facing elections in 2026/2027, both where legitimate protests of youth and citizens on issues of inflation, economic issues and immigration have been mostly hijacked by second generation north African migrants or entities with strong affinieites towards the pro-Palestine movements or the Muslim brotherhood resulting in violence and looting and a perception of lawlessness.

What is already visible is the emergence of new points of contact between movements that were once treated as separate parts of Italian public life. Whether these contacts develop into lasting political alliances, temporary coalitions or simply parallel forms of opposition will be one of the questions worth watching as Prime Minister Meloni completes her historic first mandate and seeks a second.