Students or spies? How China infiltrated US universities

Nearly 277,000 Chinese students in American universities stare at an uncertain future as the United States will start "aggressively" revoking visas of Chinese students, including those with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields. The Trump administration last week cited Harvard University's ties to China as among several reasons for revoking its ability to enroll foreign students, a move temporarily blocked by a US judge. The number of Chinese students in the US, a Reuters report said, dropped to about 277,000 in 2024 from a high of around 370,000 in 2019, pulled lower by growing tension between the world's two biggest economies, heightened US government scrutiny of Chinese students, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the past decade or so, a large number of cases have come up in which Chinese students, researchers and professors were found to be spying for the Chinese government or were linked to the Chinese military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It is now commonly known that China has done pilferage of American technology and research at a huge scale to ramp up its industry and military. The US universities have become high-value targets in China's broader campaign of intellectual property theft and intelligence gathering. The academic environment—open, collaborative, and largely unguarded—has proven fertile ground for covert operations conducted under the cover of education and research.

"A lot of our ideas, technology, research, innovation is incubated on those university campuses," Bill Evanina, then a top counterintelligence official in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, had told NBC News in 2020. "That's where the science and technology originates — and that's why it's the most prime place to steal."


Then FBI Director Christopher Wray had told a Senate hearing in 2018 that his agents across the country are seeing "non-traditional collectors (of intelligence), especially in the academic setting". "Every Chinese student who China sends here has to go through a party and government approval process," one senior US official had told Reuters at that time. "You may not be here for espionage purposes as traditionally defined, but no Chinese student who’s coming here is untethered from the state."

In response to this growing pattern of espionage, the US tightened its visa policies for Chinese nationals in STEM fields. In 2020, the Trump administration began selectively revoking visas for Chinese graduate students with ties to PLA institutions. The Biden administrations expanded this scrutiny.

How China infiltrated American universities
Rather than resort to high-stakes spy games, China’s approach is slow, methodical, and often entirely legal — or at least, operating in legal gray zones. American research labs and university departments, funded by billions in taxpayer dollars through agencies like the National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Science Foundation (NSF), and Department of Defense (DoD), have become fertile ground for technology theft by China.

Chinese nationals working at these institutions have repeatedly been caught transferring sensitive data, proprietary algorithms, and advanced research back to China. In some cases, professors themselves — either of Chinese descent or with lucrative ties to Chinese institutions — have been co-opted into talent recruitment programs in China which incentivizes scientists to share or replicate American breakthroughs on Chinese soil.

One of the key instruments of infiltration by the Chinese state in American universities has been the Chinese Scholarship Council (CSC), which funds thousands of Chinese students to study abroad. Many of these scholarships come with ideological and political strings attached. Recipients are often required to report back to Chinese embassies, sign loyalty pledges, and in some cases, participate in intelligence-gathering efforts. These arrangements are rarely disclosed to US universities.

Programs such as the “Thousand Talents Plan” and “Ten Thousand Talents Program” were launched by China to lure Chinese scientists and engineers working abroad back to China, often while they remained employed at US institutions.

Launched in 2008, the Thousand Talents Plan was one of the CCP’s most audacious projects, offering grants, lab access, and prestige to researchers who agreed to funnel intellectual property back to China. While framed as a way to reverse brain drain and attract overseas Chinese talent, the program quickly became a vehicle for tech transfer—drawing scrutiny from U.S. intelligence agencies and university administrators alike. In several high-profile cases, American academics failed to disclose their affiliations with the program while simultaneously receiving U.S. federal research grants—a clear conflict of interest and, in some cases, fraud.

Perhaps the most insidious method has involved Chinese military-affiliated researchers entering US universities under civilian pretenses. A 2020 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute estimated that hundreds of PLA scientists conducted research at American institutions. Some deliberately concealed their ties to military organizations, gaining access to sensitive technologies in fields like quantum computing, artificial intelligence and biotechnology.

Many American universities, especially elite research institutions, have often turned a blind eye to these activities, driven by their own incentives: foreign student tuition, international partnerships, and access to global talent. Many institutions welcomed funding from Chinese universities and institutions, even those known to be affiliated with the Chinese military. Some administrators ignored red flags to preserve relationships or out of fear of appearing xenophobic.

Confucius Institutes, a CCP arm on American campuses
Confucius Institutes, launched by China in 2004, were ostensibly designed to promote Chinese language and culture overseas through partnerships with foreign universities. By 2017, there were over 100 such institutes operating in the US, embedded within prestigious campuses and often funded by the Chinese state. While Confucius Institutes advertised themselves as benign centers for cultural exchange, critics, especially within US intelligence, began to view them as tools for Chinese state influence and covert operations. By 2018, then FBI Director Christopher Wray publicly warned that these institutes could be part of a larger “whole-of-society” threat from China. The FBI began briefing universities about the potential risks posed by them, and in some cases, opened investigations into specific personnel linked to espionage concerns.

In 2018, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which prohibited any U.S. university hosting a Confucius Institute from receiving Department of Defense funding for Chinese language instruction unless they secured a national security waiver. This created a financial disincentive for institutions to maintain ties with Confucius Institutes. In August 2020, the US State Department designated the Confucius Institute US Center (CIUS) as a foreign mission of the People's Republic of China. This label, usually reserved for diplomatic entities, formally recognized CIUS as a propaganda arm of the CCP. This move required Confucius Institutes to register their activities and personnel with the U.S. government, subjecting them to greater scrutiny.

Following government pressure and public scrutiny, American universities began voluntarily terminating Confucius Institutes' agreements. By early 2023, over 100 Confucius Institutes had been closed in the US, including those at prominent institutions such as the University of Chicago, Penn State and Texas A&M. Many universities cited concerns over academic freedom, administrative control and geopolitical implications.

By now, Confucius Institutes have been almost entirely purged from US academic campuses. The Confucius Institutes' downfall in the U.S. represents a landmark in how the country addresses foreign influence and covert activity within academic settings. What began as an experiment in soft diplomacy devolved into a national security liability.

Prominent cases of Chinese students and researchers working as spies

The decision to revoke visas of Chinese students with PLA ties comes in the wake of a large number of cases where students and researchers were found to be stealing technology for China or working on the behalf of China. Below are some of such cases compiled from various sources:

While not Chinese himself, Charles Lieber, a prominent nanotechnology scientist and former chair of Harvard’s Chemistry Department, was deeply entangled in China’s academic espionage apparatus, along with two Chinese nationals, Yanqing Ye and Zaosong Zheng. In 2021, he was convicted of lying to federal authorities about his financial ties to China’s Thousand Talents Plan and receiving $50,000 per month from Wuhan University of Technology. Lieber’s case exposed how even elite institutions can become complicit in technological transfer, wittingly or not.

Yanqing Ye, a lieutenant in the People’s Liberation Army, entered the United States on a student visa and studied at Boston University’s Department of Biomedical Engineering. According to the FBI, she maintained active military status while conducting research and was tasked with gathering intelligence on U.S. military sites. She fled to China before facing prosecution. Her case highlighted the difficulty in vetting student identities and affiliations.

Wang Xin, a researcher in the medical sciences at the University of California, was discovered in 2020 to be an active PLA technician. He attempted to smuggle biological samples back to China and misrepresented his military status on visa applications. According to court documents, his mission included gathering information on American lab design and medical innovations. After being apprehended at the airport, he confessed his military assignment and was deported.

Song Guo Zheng, a professor of internal medicine at Ohio State University and Pennsylvania State University, pled guilty in 2020 to making false statements to federal authorities as part of a scheme to use over $4 million in grants from the NIH to develop China’s expertise in rheumatology and immunology through his undisclosed partnership with a Chinese university controlled by the Chinese government.

Saw-Teong Ang, a University of Arkansas professor, was indicted in 2020 for wire fraud for his acceptance of U.S contracting funds related to NASA and the Air Force while being employed by Chinese entities.

Zhengdong Cheng, a professor at Texas A&M, was charged in 2020 with wire fraud for concealing his affiliation with Chinese universities and enterprises while accepting a NASA grant. His position allowed him access to sensitive NASA projects. He was a participant of the Thousand Talents Plan.

Guan Lei, a researcher at the University of California at Los Angeles, was charged in 2020 with destruction of evidence during an FBI investigation. Guan is being investigated for transferring sensitive software and other technical data to the PLA and China's National University of Defense Technology.

Former University of Florida professor Lin Yang was indicted in 2021 on charges of committing wire fraud and making false statements regarding a $1.75 million grant from the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The indictment alleges Yang concealed a business he established in China promoting a product he created using the NIH grant and applying to join China’s Thousand Talent Program.

Visiting Stanford researcher Chen Song was indicted in 2021 for obstruction, alteration of records, visa fraud charges and false statements regarding her status as a member of the PRC military forces while conducting brain disease research in the United States.

University of Arkansas Professor, Simon Saw-Teong Ang, pleaded guilty in 2022 to making a materially false and fictitious statement and representation to an FBI Special Agent for failing to disclose his 24 Chinese patents to the university and to the FBI, when interviewed.