If Netanyahu loses, what happens next in the US-Israeli war on Iran?

Israel's longest-serving prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, faces a consequential election on Tuesday, which is the first national vote since the Hamas-led attack of October 7, 2023, and the wars that followed in Gaza, Lebanon and, most importantly, Iran. Netanyahu has used Trump's endorsement to argue that only his leadership could secure further US action against Iran. Trump has called on Israelis to re-elect him, saying the two countries had to finish the job they started in February.

But the immediate military picture is more complicated. Major fighting has been suspended for months while the United States and Iran remain locked in a confrontation over sanctions, oil exports and the Strait of Hormuz. A Netanyahu defeat could weaken the political push for renewed Israeli strikes, although it would not automatically remove the threat of another US-Iran war.

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What path would a new Israeli leader choose?

According to reports, Netanyahu had pressed Trump to approve a joint strike on Iran before the Israeli election, but Washington wanted to delay action until it was ready. The Israeli prime minister's office denied the report.

It appears that the timing of military action is not determined by a shared US-Israeli threat assessment alone; political calculations, military readiness and coordination between the two governments also matter.

If Netanyahu loses, an incoming prime minister could take a more cautious approach to restarting the campaign, particularly if the new government wants to avoid being drawn into another prolonged conflict. The immediate effect could be a lower likelihood of an Israeli attempt to force Washington's hand.

However, that would not amount to a commitment to peace. It would instead give the new government an opportunity to reassess the timing and purpose of further operations.

Eisenkot won't make a clean break with Netanyahu's Iran policy

Netanyahu's principal challenger, Gadi Eisenkot, is a former military chief of staff who has presented himself as a more responsible alternative on national security. He has also praised Trump as a friend of Israel, saying he would cooperate with the US president if elected. That suggests a change in leadership need not produce any significant rupture in the US-Israeli security relationship.

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Netanyahu and his main rivals have broadly similar approaches to regional security, including Iran. So, Netanyahu's defeat in the polls may not simply mean an end to the Iran confrontation. Eisenkot's criticism has focused on Netanyahu's conduct and his alleged use of the Iran threat for electoral advantage, rather than on a promise to abandon Israel's security objectives linked to Iran.

An Eisenkot-led government could therefore maintain pressure on Iran's military capabilities and oppose its nuclear ambitions while seeking tighter coordination with Washington. The shift would be more likely to concern how and when Israel uses force than whether it considers Iran a strategic threat.

Trump's decisions could matter more

The biggest uncertainty is whether Trump wants to resume a full-scale war or use military pressure to extract concessions from Iran. Netanyahu has portrayed his personal relationship with Trump as a decisive advantage. But it appears that Washington has its own timetable and is not necessarily prepared to act whenever Israel wants it to.

According to reports, US forces in the Middle East are prepared to launch potentially major operations against Iran within 96 hours of receiving an order from Trump. The planned campaign could go beyond limited strikes on radar systems and missile launchers. So, the military option remains available regardless of who occupies the prime minister's office in Jerusalem.

There is also a domestic constraint in the US. The Iran war has become unpopular among Americans, with rising fuel prices adding to the political costs. Trump has said Washington will not attack Iran before the November 3 US midterm elections. A new Israeli government could give him more room to pursue diplomacy, but it would not remove the domestic pressure to demonstrate that the war has produced tangible results.

The diplomatic opening is already there

Senior officials from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, all members of the Mecca pact, are meeting Iranian officials in Tehran in an effort to de-escalate the regional conflict. Qatar has also been involved in mediation.

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The discussions cover US-Iran negotiations, the Strait of Hormuz and the American blockade of Iranian ports. Iran has said it will not resume talks on Washington's terms while the blockade remains in place and sanctions continue to restrict its oil exports.

However, Iran remains open to resuming negotiations under an interim arrangement brokered by mediators. It has offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz if Washington lifts its naval blockade, but the two sides remain at odds over the conditions for restarting talks. Earlier efforts to stabilise the conflict had broken down after fighting resumed.

A Netanyahu defeat could help these efforts if a successor is more willing to coordinate with Washington and accept a diplomatic process that does not immediately deliver all of Israel's demands. But Iran's nuclear programme remains a central obstacle. A change of government in Israel cannot resolve that disagreement by itself.

The coalition will influence Israel's Iran policy

Israel's parliamentary system makes the election result only the first stage of the political process. Neither Netanyahu's bloc nor the opposition is assured of the 61 seats required for a majority in the 120-member Knesset. Even if Netanyahu's party, Likud, loses, negotiations over coalition partners could take weeks or months. That uncertainty will influence Iran policy to a large extent.

A government led by Eisenkot could seek to reduce the influence of far-right parties that have supported Netanyahu's hardline approach. But its freedom to change course would depend on which parties join the coalition and what compromises they demand.

Both Eisenkot and Netanyahu share hawkish positions on regional security. A new government might be less inclined to escalate for political reasons, but it would still face pressure to prevent Iran from rebuilding its military capabilities.

A narrow or unstable coalition could also struggle to make long-term commitments to a diplomatic settlement. If its partners disagree over the terms of an agreement with Iran, the government could remain confrontational even without Netanyahu.

Impact on regional security and oil markets

The conflict is no longer confined to Israel and Iran. Houthi attacks on Saudi targets have intensified in the past few weeks, raising concerns about oil infrastructure and shipping routes. The Strait of Hormuz remains a major pressure point for global energy supplies, while the Bab el-Mandeb Strait presents another risk to regional commerce.

A reduction in the prospect of Israeli strikes could improve market sentiment and create more room for regional diplomacy. Investors may see potential benefits from an opposition victory, including lower political risk and a possible easing of regional tensions. But markets would still respond to the actual course of the conflict, not simply the identity of Israel's prime minister.

If Washington and Tehran continue their confrontation over the blockade, or if the Houthis intensify attacks on Saudi infrastructure, the economic fallout could persist even after Netanyahu leaves office. A leadership change may improve the conditions for de-escalation without guaranteeing it.

A lower risk of escalation

A Netanyahu defeat would remove a leader who has made renewed military action against Iran a central part of his political pitch. It could reduce the risk of an Israeli government pressing for immediate strikes and give diplomacy more space.

But Trump will continue to retain the military option while Iran remains under pressure but unwilling to accept Washington's terms, and Israel's leading opposition figures continue to regard Iran as a serious security threat.

In the event of Netanyahu's defeat, the most plausible immediate change could therefore be in the timing and political management of the conflict, rather than a reversal of Israel's Iran policy. Whether that creates a durable ceasefire will depend less on Netanyahu's departure alone than on Trump's willingness to compromise, Iran's response and the stability of Israel's next government.