A global carve-up? Fears of Trump, Xi, Putin striking a grand bargain
The first-ever meeting involving US President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Shenzhen has raised concerns about whether the three powers could reach informal understandings over global influence,...

Trump has said he intends to discuss limiting nuclear weapons and ending the war in Ukraine. However, his aides had earlier told reporters that the Ukraine conflict would not feature in the trilateral meeting.
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There are concerns that the unprecedented trilateral meeting could touch some of the world’s most sensitive geopolitical fault lines. Ukraine, the war involving Iran, nuclear arms control, trade and artificial intelligence are among the issues likely to figure in discussions.
Many think the three leaders could use the occasion to reach an informal understanding on their respective spheres of influence, particularly at the expense of smaller countries such as Ukraine and Taiwan, much like the 1945 Yalta Conference. While the symbolism is striking, the competing interests of Washington, Beijing and Moscow suggest such a prospect is far from inevitable.
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Why Yalta is back in the conversation
In February 1945, US President Franklin D Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin met at the Crimean resort town of Yalta as the Second World War was nearing its conclusion in Europe. Germany was close to defeat and Soviet forces had already occupied large parts of Eastern Europe. The three leaders discussed the occupation of defeated Germany, the establishment of occupation zones, the future of Poland and the creation of the United Nations.
The Yalta conference also produced an agreement on Soviet participation in the war against Japan in return for concessions in East Asia. On Poland, Stalin secured substantial Soviet influence over the country's post-war political arrangements, despite Western insistence on free elections. The eventual Soviet domination of much of Eastern Europe became one of the defining features of the emerging Cold War.
Historically, the Yalta conference stands for the idea that powerful countries could determine the political future of smaller nations without giving them a meaningful say. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has expressed such a concern, warning against a redistribution of spheres of influence in the 21st century.
Putin sees the gathering as an opportunity to secure an end to the Ukraine war on terms favourable to Moscow. Trump is looking for a diplomatic achievement. Xi has reasons to be more cautious, particularly about being drawn into an arrangement that treats China as an equal participant in US-Russian nuclear arms negotiations.
Of the issues facing the three leaders, Ukraine presents the clearest possibility of an informal spheres-of-influence arrangement. Putin wants an end to the war that preserves Russian territorial gains and limits Ukraine's ability to align militarily with the West. A direct conversation with Trump offers him an opportunity to pursue these objectives without having to negotiate with Kyiv or European governments. It would also help Moscow establish that Washington recognises Russia as a power entitled to determine the security arrangements of its neighbourhood.
There is a political incentive for Trump as well. A settlement would allow him to claim progress on a war that has become a major test of his foreign policy. But the danger is that a ceasefire or peace agreement could effectively reward territorial aggression and leave Ukraine with limited sovereignty over its future security choices.
However, Reuters reported that Moscow had pushed to include Ukraine on the Shenzhen agenda, while Beijing was reluctant to do so. A US official also indicated that Trump was unlikely to raise the war in a three-way discussion, arguing that the format was unsuitable for the subject.
The concerns are not confined to Ukraine alone. European governments fear that an agreement negotiated over their heads could directly affect the continent's security architecture. Also, any Chinese involvement in securing Russian concessions could come at a price. If Beijing offers to pressure Moscow, it could seek concessions in return. Such negotiations should need European participation rather than treating the continent as a passive beneficiary of decisions taken elsewhere.
There is, therefore, a genuine Yalta-like risk here, although it is more likely to concern the terms of Ukraine's future than a formal division of Europe.
China's potential sphere of influence
For Beijing, the most consequential question is whether Washington will continue to resist China's attempts to establish greater control over its immediate neighbourhood, particularly Taiwan.
The Yalta analogy is especially sensitive for Taiwan because any understanding between Trump and Xi that limits American support for the country could fundamentally change the regional balance. Beijing regards reunification as a core national objective, while Taiwan has its own elected government and rejects China's claim to sovereignty over it.
However, there is little evidence that Xi is approaching Shenzhen with a straightforward territorial bargain in mind.
During his visit to Manila, Trump has just reaffirmed deeper US defence cooperation with the Philippines which is involved in an increasingly tense dispute with China over the South China Sea. Any suggestion that Washington is prepared to abandon its regional commitments would therefore have consequences well beyond Taiwan.
Other regional allies are also part of the equation. Japan worries about the strengthening Russia-China relationship, while South Korea faces the implications of North Korea's expanding nuclear capabilities.
An informal understanding that leaves China with greater freedom of action in the Indo-Pacific cannot be ruled out. But it would require Washington to weaken relationships with countries that remain central to its regional security strategy.
Why the Big 3 can't carve up the world
The strongest argument against a Yalta 2.0 is that the three leaders do not share the strategic interests that brought Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin together in 1945. The original Yalta meeting took place when the Allies were approaching victory in a common war. Their armies controlled territory and their decisions could be implemented through military occupation. The post-war settlement was therefore being negotiated by powers with immediate control over the territories under discussion.
Shenzhen is a very different situation. The US, China and Russia are competitors with overlapping but often conflicting interests. There is no common military victory to consolidate and no comparable division of occupied territory waiting to be formalised.
The US-China rivalry over trade and technology is intensifying while Beijing has little interest in joining Trump's proposed nuclear disarmament negotiations. Trump is in a stalemate with Iran and it may be difficult for him to find a common ground with the two countries that support Iran.
The nuclear question too is complicated. The US and Russia each possess more than 5,000 nuclear warheads, compared with China's estimated stockpile of around 500. Beijing has little incentive to accept restrictions designed around the much larger arsenals of its competitors.
A senior Trump administration official told Reuters that Washington did not expect an agreement on nuclear issues at the meeting. The fact that such a central item on Trump's agenda faces resistance from Beijing underlines how difficult it will be to negotiate a wider strategic settlement.
Smaller countries are no pawns
Another important difference from 1945 is that countries outside the negotiating room have considerably greater capacity to resist decisions imposed by larger powers.
Ukraine has demonstrated that Russia cannot simply dictate the political and military future of its neighbours. Despite Moscow's overwhelming military advantages, Kyiv has continued to resist the invasion and has retained substantial Western support. Any settlement that ignores Ukrainian interests would face the challenge of being accepted and implemented on the ground.
The same applies to Taiwan. Its government, military capabilities and international economic relationships make it difficult for Washington and Beijing to settle its future through a private understanding alone.
Unlike the countries discussed at Yalta, those today have greater room to manoeuvre and can seek support from other international powers.
The international economic system also makes neat territorial divisions difficult. Trade, technology, energy supplies and financial networks connect countries across competing geopolitical blocs. China's dependence on international markets and Russia's reliance on Chinese economic support are examples of relationships that do not fit easily into mutually exclusive spheres of influence.
A new Yalta may only be in the symbolism
The Shenzhen summit is unlikely to produce a formal agreement dividing the world into American, Chinese and Russian spheres of influence. The three leaders have too many conflicting priorities and too little trust to establish such an arrangement. Even the agenda remains subject to disagreements over what each country wants to discuss.
But dismissing the Yalta comparison altogether would also be a mistake. The danger lies less in a grand agreement than in a series of bilateral understandings that gradually weaken the freedom of smaller countries to determine their own futures.
Putin could emerge with greater international legitimacy and a settlement that accommodates some Russian demands in Ukraine. Xi could benefit if Washington becomes less willing to challenge Chinese actions in the Indo-Pacific. Trump could claim diplomatic victories without necessarily securing lasting concessions from either leader.
The Shenzhen summit is likely to be more symbolic than substantial. For Putin in particular, simply appearing alongside the American and Chinese presidents reinforces Russia's claim to great-power status.
The more realistic concern is not a second Yalta in which three leaders redraw the world map overnight but a gradual emergence of informal spheres of influence through selective compromises, weakened alliances and the acceptance of faits accomplis. Shenzhen may not create a new world order like Yalta did, but it could offer an early indication of how far the three powers are prepared to accommodate one another at smaller countries' expense.
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