Bombardier-Black Hawk crash in Washington DC cause: Faulty altimeter blinded pilots, lax airspace rules; Army-FAA clash during hearing

A broken altimeter, ignored safety warnings, and poor coordination between federal agencies were key factors in the deadly midair collision over Washington in January that killed 67 people, according to findings revealed during a three-day fact-finding hearing by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) this week.

On January 29, a Bombardier CRJ700 jet collided with a Black Hawk helicopter while descending into Reagan Airport near the White House, marking the deadliest US aviation disaster since 2001.

Victims included young figure skaters, their families, coaches, and several union workers. Now, months later, the NTSB’s hearing has offered the most detailed picture yet of what went wrong.

The broken altimeter that misled pilots

The Army helicopter was flying 278 feet above ground, well above the 200-foot ceiling allowed for its route, when it collided with the descending airliner.

However, investigators say the pilots may not have known they were too high. The helicopter’s barometric altimeter showed a reading 80 to 100 feet lower than its actual altitude.

This discrepancy, recorded by the flight data recorder, was not an isolated incident. Similar issues were later found in other helicopters from the same Army unit. A Sikorsky representative told AP that the crashed Black Hawk was an older model without advanced air data computers found in newer aircraft.

Army Chief Warrant Officer Kylene Lewis told the NTSB, as reported by AP, that an 80- to 100-foot discrepancy between a helicopter's altimeters isn't alarming, as pilots rely more on radar altimeters at lower altitudes.

Additionally, Army pilots aim to maintain their target altitude within 100 feet, making such discrepancies manageable.

FAA, Army shift blame in heated testimony

Throughout the hearings, the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) and the Army sought to deflect responsibility. Yet testimony pointed to multiple opportunities where safer choices could have prevented the tragedy.

One major concern was the extremely narrow separation distance, just 75 feet or around 23 meters, approved by the FAA between helicopters and landing aircraft at Reagan’s secondary runway.

This particular runway is only used in about 5 per cent of flights but played a critical role on the night of the crash.

Army pilots testified that flying beneath landing planes was often routine, as long as they followed their approved routes. However, the air traffic controller never warned the passenger jet about the helicopter’s proximity, assuming it wouldn’t have changed the outcome.

On the night of the crash, a controller asked the helicopter pilots twice if they saw the jet, and they confirmed they did, requesting visual separation.

Testimony raised concerns about the crew's ability to see the plane through night vision goggles and whether they were looking in the right direction.

The controller was overwhelmed with work

According to NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy, the controller, whose identity remains unknown, managed 21 aircraft in the 10 minutes before the collision. He was handling both helicopter and jet traffic simultaneously. According to a Washington Post report, in his interview, he stated that he felt overwhelmed and considered asking for help, but the traffic soon became manageable.

A pilot arriving just before the crash noted that the controller seemed “exceptionally busy” and was “not instilling a lot of confidence.”

As per the AP report, the controller admitted that the plane's pilots were not warned of a collision course, believing it wouldn’t have made a difference. The plane, descending to land, attempted to pull up after receiving a warning, but it was too late.

Safety warnings were repeatedly ignored

Years before the crash, FAA teams had raised alarms about the growing risk of helicopter operations around Reagan. In 2022, one working group urged the agency to add caution advisories to flight charts. The FAA declined.

Separately, a radar facility manager wrote to the FAA recommending a reduction in air traffic due to safety risks. Those concerns also went unheeded.

In her closing remarks, NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy accused the FAA of failing to act on repeated warnings. She criticized the agency for transferring out airport managers after the crash instead of addressing the root problems.

“Every sign was there that there was a safety risk,” Homendy said during the hearing.

Final report due in 2026

The NTSB is expected to release its final report next year. While it is unlikely to identify a single cause, this week’s hearings confirmed a troubling mix of equipment failure, institutional inaction, and operational shortcuts that ultimately led to one of the deadliest aviation disasters in recent US history.