Lindsey Graham may be dead, but his ‘bunker-buster’ looms over India

Just hours before his death, Senator Lindsey Graham was still pushing one of the most controversial pieces of foreign policy legislation on Capitol Hill that matters for India directly. Graham may no longer be around to shepherd his Russia Sanctions Bill through Congress, but the legislation he spent more than a year promoting continues to loom over New Delhi's energy security calculations. In fact, his death may have given the bill fresh political momentum, with lawmakers from both parties now calling for its passage as a tribute to his legacy.

The proposed legislation has long worried India because it goes far beyond conventional sanctions on Russia. Instead, it targets the countries that continue buying Russian energy, placing India and China squarely in its sights. Graham himself repeatedly described the measure as an "economic bunker-buster", a term meant to convey its ability to strike at the financial foundations of Russia's war effort by targeting the revenues generated through energy exports.

Only two days before his death, Graham announced that senators had finally reached an agreement with the Trump administration on an updated version of the legislation after months of negotiations. What exactly changed remains unclear. That uncertainty may be the most important question facing India today.


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The bill puts India in the cross hairs

The original sanctions proposal was designed to impose severe economic penalties on countries that continue purchasing Russian oil, gas, petrochemicals and uranium. Its most eye-catching provision was a 500% tariff on imports into the US from countries buying Russian energy.

That provision was never aimed primarily at Russia itself. It was aimed at Russia's customers. Since the start of the Ukraine war, Moscow has successfully redirected much of its energy exports away from Europe and toward Asia. China and India emerged as the biggest beneficiaries of discounted Russian crude, helping keep Russian export revenues flowing despite Western sanctions.

Graham rarely hid who he believed was keeping Russia's economy afloat. Last year, he publicly warned both India and China that if the bill became law, they would have "nobody to blame but yourself" for the consequences. He argued that countries continuing to buy Russian energy were effectively helping finance Vladimir Putin's war machine.

The legislation reflected a growing view among Ukraine's supporters in Washington that sanctions on Russia alone were insufficient. If Russia could still sell oil, then pressure needed to shift toward the buyers.

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Why Trump spent months resisting it

The bill's popularity in Congress stood in sharp contrast to the hesitation coming from the White House. Trump entered his second term promising to repair relations with Moscow and position himself as a mediator capable of ending the Ukraine war. From that perspective, Graham's sanctions package created a problem. A rigid sanctions regime would reduce the administration's room for diplomatic manoeuvre and potentially undermine negotiations with the Kremlin.

According to reporting by The Wall Street Journal, administration officials spent months quietly lobbying Graham and other supporters to soften the legislation. One major demand involved changing mandatory language. The White House reportedly wanted provisions that said the president "may" impose sanctions rather than "shall" impose them. That distinction sounds technical but carries enormous consequences.

Under the original approach, sanctions would effectively become automatic once triggering conditions were met. Under the White House's preferred approach, the president would retain discretion over whether and when penalties were imposed.

The administration also sought broad waiver powers covering allies, strategic partners, essential goods and national security interests. Automatic sanctions would unnecessarily tie Trump's hands and complicate diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the war. Those concerns appeared to slow the legislation despite growing congressional support.

The White House may have had reservations, but Congress increasingly embraced the proposal. By June 2025, Graham was publicly boasting that the legislation had attracted 84 Senate co-sponsors, an extraordinary level of bipartisan backing for a major foreign policy measure.

The bill did not advance but the breakthrough finally came on July 10, when Graham, Richard Blumenthal, Jeanne Shaheen and Roger Wicker announced that they had reached an agreement with the Trump administration and expected updated legislation to be unveiled shortly. The senators said the bill would provide new tools to impose costs on countries purchasing Russian oil and natural gas. What those tools look like in the revised text remains unknown.

Graham's death may give the bill new momentum

Ordinarily, the death of a bill's chief sponsor can leave legislation stranded. Yet the opposite may happen here. Soon after Graham's death, lawmakers began arguing that passing the sanctions package would be the most fitting way to honour his legacy. Senator Jeanne Shaheen urged Congress to move forward with the legislation, saying there could be no more appropriate memorial to Graham's decades-long support for Ukraine. Senator Richard Blumenthal likewise argued that immediate passage would be a fitting tribute. Representative Mike Turner publicly called for Senate action, while Representative Michael McCaul announced plans to introduce Russia sanctions legislation in the House.

The political symbolism is obvious. Graham spent years positioning himself as one of Washington's most vocal supporters of Ukraine. The sanctions bill became one of the signature causes of his final years in the Senate. That makes it harder for supporters of the legislation to simply let it fade away.

Why India is more exposed than ever

The timing is particularly uncomfortable for New Delhi because India's dependence on Russian energy has continued to grow. According to the latest data from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, India's imports of Russian crude reached a record high in June 2026. Indian purchases of Russian crude totalled €4.5 billion during the month, a 34% increase from May. Overall imports of Russian fossil fuels reached €5.5 billion. Crude oil accounted for roughly 83% of India's purchases. Oil products and coal made up most of the remainder.

The longer-term picture is even more striking. Since the G7 price cap system came into effect in December 2022, China has purchased around half of Russia's crude exports while India has accounted for roughly 36%. The two Asian giants have become the backbone of Russia's export market. For advocates of the sanctions bill, that statistic is precisely the point. The legislation was crafted to pressure the countries that continue generating demand for Russian energy.

For India, however, the issue looks very different. India imports close to 90% of its crude oil requirements. Russian supplies have become a crucial source of discounted energy at a time of persistent global volatility. Indian governments have repeatedly argued that energy procurement decisions are driven by economic necessity rather than geopolitical alignment.

New Delhi has also pointed out that much of its Russian oil buying complied with the G7's own price-cap framework. When the $60-per-barrel cap on Russian seaborne crude came into force in December 2022, India largely purchased oil below that threshold.

Yet Washington's mood has evolved. During Trump's second term, pressure on India over Russian oil purchases increased. At various points, administration officials suggested that exceptions had been tolerated partly because of concerns about global supply disruptions. That tolerance may not last forever.

The unanswered question

The biggest uncertainty now is not whether the bill remains alive but what it finally says. The real question is what emerged from the months of White House negotiations. Does it still have that 500% "economic bunker-buster" tariffs provision?

If Trump's demands were largely accepted, the final legislation could look very different from the original version that alarmed India with its 500% tariff threat. Broad waiver authority could allow the president to exempt allies, suspend penalties or tailor sanctions to specific circumstances. The headline-grabbing 500% tariff might remain on paper while becoming subject to extensive presidential discretion.

That would transform the legislation from an automatic punishment mechanism into a pressure tool that Washington could deploy selectively. For India, that would matters enormously. A rigid sanctions regime could threaten energy security, disrupt refinery operations and create major uncertainty for companies handling Russian crude. A flexible regime would still create pressure but would give the White House room to accommodate broader strategic considerations, including America's growing partnership with India. The problem for New Delhi may be that nobody outside the negotiations yet knows where that balance has landed.

Lindsey Graham's death removes the most visible face of the Russia sanctions campaign, but It does not remove the campaign itself. Graham may have died before seeing his economic bunker-buster enacted but the pressure mechanism he designed to target Russia's energy customers remains very much alive. And as India's purchases of Russian oil continue to climb, the legislation's shadow may be growing longer.