China's warning reveals what really happened at Modi-Takaichi summit

China's response to the Modi-Takaichi summit in New Delhi was swift and revealing. Within hours of India and Japan unveiling a series of agreements on defence, critical minerals, artificial intelligence, energy security and economic resilience, Beijing cautioned that cooperation between countries should not target a third party or create "exclusive small groupings". On the surface, the statement appeared routine but it reflected a growing concern in Beijing that India and Japan are moving their partnership into areas that directly touch China's economic, strategic and military interests.

Beyond dozens of pacts India and Japan signed, China could be worried about foundations being laid of a new order in the Indo-Pacific and Modi-Takaichi summit being one big piece of it.

More than a bilateral summit


The immediate reason for China's concern lies in the nature of the agreements announced in Delhi. India and Japan did not limit themselves to traditional diplomatic language about friendship and cooperation. Instead, they unveiled a roadmap on economic security, agreed to strengthen supply chain resilience in semiconductors and critical minerals, launched a defence co-development project, reviewed trade arrangements and expanded cooperation in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence.

Each of these areas has become a geopolitical battleground. Semiconductors sit at the heart of technological competition. Critical minerals are indispensable for electric vehicles, electronics and military equipment. Defence industrial cooperation influences long-term military capabilities. When these sectors are brought together under an economic security framework, Beijing inevitably sees strategic intent behind the partnership.

Chinese officials may not publicly acknowledge it, but much of the summit agenda touched areas where China currently enjoys significant leverage. The push for diversified supply chains and reduced dependence on any single country was especially notable because it mirrors concerns increasingly voiced by countries worried about overreliance on Chinese manufacturing and processing networks.

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The critical minerals challenge

One of the summit's most significant outcomes was the emphasis on critical minerals cooperation. This issue strikes directly at one of China's strongest positions in the global economy. China accounts for the overwhelming majority of rare earth processing and remains central to global supply chains for strategic minerals used in batteries, electronics, renewable energy technologies and defence systems. Beijing has not hesitated to use this dominance as a geopolitical tool. In recent years, export controls and restrictions have become instruments of economic statecraft.

The India-Japan decision to deepen cooperation in mineral exploration, processing and supply chain resilience is therefore about much more than trade. It represents an attempt to build alternatives. While neither India nor Japan can replace China's position overnight, Beijing understands that diversification efforts by major economies can gradually weaken its ability to use supply chains as leverage. This concern is heightened by the fact that China has already used restrictions on rare earth exports in disputes involving Japan and other countries. From Beijing's perspective, any initiative aimed at creating parallel supply networks ultimately chips away at one of its most effective sources of influence.

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A new phase in defence cooperation

The defence dimension of the summit is even more consequential, not just for the pacts signed but for the emergence of a clear new direction. Modi and Takaichi announced the first India-Japan co-development project in the form of the Unified Complex Radio Antenna, or UNICORN. The system is expected to enhance naval stealth capabilities and represents a tangible move from defence dialogue to defence production.

What makes this particularly significant is the larger transformation underway in Japan's security policy. For decades after World War II, Japan maintained stringent restrictions on arms exports. Those restrictions were progressively loosened under Shinzo Abe and later governments. Under Takaichi, however, Japan has crossed a threshold by permitting exports of lethal defence equipment and opening the door to genuine co-development and co-production arrangements.

China has watched this evolution with growing unease. Beijing's strategic planners are well aware that a more militarily proactive Japan fundamentally alters the regional balance. The prospect of Japanese technology combining with India's industrial capacity and expanding defence manufacturing ambitions creates a partnership with long-term implications. The UNICORN project itself may be modest compared to larger defence programmes, but China is unlikely to view it in isolation. Beijing will see it as a potential precursor to broader cooperation involving naval systems, drones, propulsion technologies and even advanced maritime platforms.

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The Takaichi factor

China's concerns are amplified by the stance of Japan's current leader. Relations between Beijing and Tokyo have deteriorated sharply under Takaichi. Her remarks on Taiwan, support for a stronger Japanese military posture and willingness to expand defence partnerships have made her one of the least favoured Japanese leaders in Beijing in recent years.

Unlike some of her predecessors who balanced security concerns with economic engagement, Takaichi has embraced a more explicit security-oriented approach. Since taking office, Japan has intensified military cooperation with South Korea, expanded security ties with Southeast Asian states such as the Philippines and Indonesia, deepened engagement with European powers and increased its profile within NATO-related forums.

From Beijing's perspective, Takaichi is not simply strengthening Japan's defences. She is actively building a network of partnerships designed to constrain Chinese influence across the Indo-Pacific. India's importance rises considerably within this framework. It is one of the few major regional powers with the strategic weight, military capability and economic scale to play a meaningful role in any balancing effort.

The Quad and the Indo-Pacific question

The summit's reaffirmation of support for the Quad added another layer to China's discomfort. Although the Quad officially focuses on practical cooperation, China has long viewed the grouping as an emerging strategic coalition aimed at limiting its influence. The four members—India, Japan, Australia and the United States—occupy critical positions across the Indo-Pacific. The joint statement's emphasis on maritime security, critical technologies, economic resilience and freedom of navigation aligns closely with the Quad's core agenda. While India continues to maintain strategic autonomy and avoids formal alliances, Beijing is increasingly concerned that practical cooperation among Quad members is producing strategic outcomes regardless of official rhetoric.

China is particularly sensitive to references about maintaining a rules-based order and opposing unilateral efforts to change the status quo by force. Such language is routinely interpreted in Beijing as criticism of Chinese actions in maritime disputes.

Why the South China Sea and East China Sea matter

The summit went beyond economic cooperation and addressed regional security issues directly. India backed Japan's concerns regarding developments in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The two leaders expressed opposition to unilateral actions that threaten freedom of navigation and attempts to alter the status quo through coercion.

These references may appear diplomatic, but they touch some of China's most contentious disputes. Beijing claims large portions of the South China Sea and has ongoing territorial disagreements with Japan in the East China Sea.

China is especially wary when countries outside these disputes become involved. India's willingness to publicly align with Japan on maritime principles shows a broader convergence of strategic interests. It suggests that maritime issues are no longer seen solely as local disputes but as questions with wider regional implications.

The shadow of an uncertain America

Ironically, one of the factors driving India and Japan closer is not China alone but uncertainty surrounding the United States. Japanese strategic thinkers increasingly worry about the reliability of American commitments under Donald Trump. While Tokyo continues to emphasise the importance of the US alliance, there is growing recognition that Japan needs additional security partnerships and greater self-reliance.

This is one reason Japan has accelerated efforts to cultivate defence relationships across Asia and beyond. India naturally emerges as a preferred partner because it shares concerns about China, possesses growing military capabilities and maintains an independent foreign policy. China understands this dynamic. Beijing's concern is not simply about today's agreements but about a future regional architecture in which countries hedge against both Chinese power and American unpredictability by forming stronger networks among themselves.

Beijing's real fear

China's statement after the summit was presented as a defence of regional stability. Yet the deeper concern is more specific. The Modi-Takaichi summit brought together two countries that are increasingly aligned on economic security, supply chain resilience, maritime stability and advanced technology cooperation. Neither India nor Japan describes their partnership as anti-China. Both continue to maintain economic relations with Beijing.

However, from a Chinese perspective, the cumulative effect matters more than official declarations. A Japan that is shedding post-war military constraints, an India that is expanding its strategic reach, stronger cooperation in critical technologies, alternative mineral supply chains and renewed momentum behind the Quad all point in one direction.

China is worried not because a formal anti-China alliance emerged in Delhi. It is worried because the summit highlighted how a series of practical partnerships are gradually creating the foundations of a regional order in which Beijing's leverage may no longer be as overwhelming as it is at present.