Variety of spectrum-sharing options

There���s much controversy in the opinion pages about the supposed loss to the exchequer on account of non-bidding for the new lot of 2G telecom licences. Licencees like Swan and Unitech have promptly resold their stakes at huge premiums, what with scarce spectrum bunged in with the licences and seemingly issued on a first-come , firstserved basis.

There���s a sound case for, say, a three-year lock-in period in the licensing norms, together with attendant roll-out obligations. But the fact remains that overall teledensity remains quite low in India, albeit fast growing. Hence the prospect that annual revenue shares would keep going up, virtually indefinitely.

The monies, cumulatively, would be far higher than would have been collected via auctions of the licences.
The way ahead now is for DoT to firm up policy for telecom spectrum sharing, so as to comprehensively boost spectral efficiency and management in what is a dynamic, technology-intensive sector.

Actually, a policy for spectrum-sharing seems necessary not just for 2G mobile telephony, or primarily for voice, but also for the 3G, read a host of value-added services. The policy to auction 3G licences makes sense, in what is likely to be a rather segmented, cellular niche. Along with dedicated, operator-specific 3G spectrum, the availability of spectrum sharing would mean innovative new products and services.

The point is that the policy process needs to take into account such developments as the emergence of ultrawideband in telecom, ���software radio��� and ���mesh networks��� that promise real flexibility in spectrum usage.

Now the traditional way for non-interference in telecom services has been to have a policy of spectrum licensing, read exclusive access to the radio spectrum . But the fact remains that even in the main urban centres, where there���s heavy density of cellular phones and other wireless devices, much of the dedicated spectrum is known to be ���idle��� at any given time and place.

Hence the need for proactive policy and new approaches to spectrum management, so as to significantly ameliorate spectral scarcity. The flexibility can rev up the value derived from spectrum. The objective ought to be to thoroughly improve both the availability and cost of umpteen wireless applications and boost teledensity, including for hitherto high-end services such as streaming video. Abroad, since at least 2004, regulators have allowed secondary licensing of telecom spectrum.

Given that emerging technology does provide avenues to considerably boost spectral efficiency, what���s surely necessary is reform of spectrum policy so as to shore up both demand and supply of new technology, and innovation in delivery of telecom services.

We do need dynamic policy and requisite regulatory guidelines that, in effect , change the logistics of spectrum usage as technology changes, or is seen to follow a new direction. The fact of the matter is that extant spectrum policies for licensing and exclusive usage have not really changed in several decades. We have been slow in introducing cellular services and have yet to do so for 3G.

However, given the strong demand for mobile telephony here���perhaps the highest anywhere���the policy needs to make the most of the new opportunities for stepping up spectral efficiency. Abroad, a wide variety of models for spectrum sharing seem to be becoming technically and economically viable and feasible.

The mavens already suggest real-time spectrum sharing, and also provision for common spectral resources. In the evolving telecom marketplace, different models seem appropriate for different applications. What���s required is a suitable policy framework so as to provide for a variety of spectrum sharing options to bring about innovation in the design, use and upgradation of wireless devices.

Going forward, it may be apt to reconsider spectrum levies and charges. Apart from the 6-10 % revenue share as annual licence fee for telecom operators , there���s an additional 2-6 % spectrum users��� fee for cellular service providers. A spectrum charge of 1% is also proposed for 3G.

Rationalisation of the charges would make much sense. The idea ought to be to optimise usage of the electromagnetic spectrum for cellular operators, including with realtime secondary trading. The provision of such a secondary market, where blocks of spectrum can be ���rented��� out for a few seconds or months would be pathbreaking indeed.

Increased spectrum sharing is crucial to cope with the scarcity of available spectrum, what with several million new mobile connections getting activated each month pan-India . It may well mean serious scarcity of available spectral resources, and perhaps much sooner than otherwise anticipated.

So there could yet be a viable policy for zillions of spectrum auctions (and in effect, licences) even in the 2G space. Auctions, after all, do allocate resources to those who value them the most. However, given that telecom access is now almost always via mobile telephony, the traditional auction method���seeking to maximise governmental revenue in the process of awarding licences���may be suboptimal for 2G. But real-time auction for spectrum could surely yield similar benefits. Which is why we need to fastforward spectrum reform.