Dirty bomb warning: The long arm of Iran looms over Washington

US intelligence agencies are investigating reports that Iran may be planning a radiological dirty bomb or chemical attack targeting senior Trump administration officials in Washington. CNN, citing seven US officials, reported that intercepted comm...

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Several American investigations have already exposed Iranian attempts to recruit people on US soil to assassinate senior officials. (AI-generated image)

The warning that Iran may be considering a dirty bomb or chemical attack in Washington will force authorities to probe how much of Iran's retaliatory capability actually lies inside the United States.

Since Operation Epic Fury began on February 28, the FBI and other federal agencies have been watching for Iranian-linked operatives, criminal intermediaries and individuals who might act on Iran's behalf. Several American investigations have already exposed Iranian attempts to recruit people on US soil to assassinate senior officials. Some of these operations came remarkably close to developing into real attacks. The latest intelligence raises the possibility that Iran could be planning something considerably more disruptive.

ALSO READ | What is 'dirty bomb' that Iran is planning to use against US, and how is it different from nuclear bomb


An uncertain operational picture

CNN reported, citing seven US officials, that American intelligence had detected Iranian planning to target senior Trump administration officials using a radiological dirty bomb or chemical weapon in Washington. Two sources said the planning included specific locations and targets. Intelligence officials were nevertheless divided over whether Iran could or would execute such an operation.

One particularly concerning element was intercepted Iranian communications claiming that bomb-making materials had already been stored inside the United States. The credibility of this information remains disputed. CNN's sources also indicated Iran's ability to mount such an attack had not necessarily increased, and what may have changed was its incentive to retaliate.
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ALSO READ | Iran may be planning a 'dirty bomb' or chemical weapons attack on Trump's top officials in Washington: Report

A dirty bomb is not a nuclear weapon but uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. Its immediate destructive power is limited compared with a nuclear explosion, but contamination could force evacuations, disrupt government operations and create an expensive public-health emergency.

The possibility of recruiting somebody already living in America cannot be ruled out. As CNN noted, Iran would not necessarily need to infiltrate a trained team of operatives. It could attempt to exploit an existing network or recruit a local intermediary. This is not an entirely hypothetical method. American investigations have repeatedly uncovered Iranian efforts to do precisely that.

The John Bolton plot
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In 2022, the US Justice Department charged Shahram Poursafi, an Iranian national and uniformed member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with attempting to arrange murder of former national security adviser John Bolton. Prosecutors said Poursafi was working on behalf of the IRGC's Quds Force, its external operations arm.

The investigation exposed a recruitment effort that began in October 2021. Poursafi approached a US resident online, initially asking the individual to photograph Bolton under the pretext that the material was required for a book. That person introduced him to an associate who was actually a confidential FBI source.
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Poursafi subsequently offered $250,000 to arrange Bolton's assassination. The amount was eventually negotiated to $300,000. According to the criminal complaint, he supplied Bolton's Washington office address and information about people working there. He also discussed using a car or a firearm to carry out the killing.

The FBI source sent him photographs of Bolton's office after travelling to Washington. Poursafi even discussed the possibility of using the building's parking garage.

The significance of this case lies in the distance between the Iranian handler and the intended attacker. Poursafi was in Tehran and had never visited the United States, but he was attempting to organise a murder through people already inside the country.

The plot was allegedly retaliation for the January 2020 American killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. Poursafi also mentioned another assassination assignment worth $1 million, which investigators and subsequent reporting linked to former secretary of state Mike Pompeo.

Poursafi appeared willing to continue such operations despite the likelihood of exposure. Levitt noted that Poursafi had told his intermediary not to worry about Iranian responsibility because the IRGC would deal with the consequences.

While Poursafi remains wanted by American authorities, the episode demonstrated that Iranian-directed assassination operations did not necessarily require an established sleeper cell or a trained terrorist entering the country.

Asif Merchant and the use of criminal intermediaries

The more recent case involving Pakistani national Asif Merchant offers another window into this approach. Merchant was convicted in March 2026 of attempting to arrange political assassinations in the US, including targeting Donald Trump, at the direction of Iran. According to the Justice Department case, he had been recruited in 2022 or early 2023 and received training in tradecraft from the IRGC.

In 2024, he travelled to the US to recruit people he believed could help execute the assignments. He approached individuals he thought were members of a criminal network. They were actually undercover law-enforcement officers.

CNN's March 28 investigation into Iranian operations in the US highlighted this growing reliance on criminal intermediaries. Iranian officials have increasingly attempted to hire people with no established ideological commitment to Tehran. Some recruitment efforts have even involved criminals approached from inside American prisons. William Wechsler, a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics and global threats who now directs Middle East programmes at the Atlantic Council, told CNN that he was more concerned about ideologically aligned individuals and lone actors than hired criminals. As per his reasoning, criminal recruits might accept money but their reliability is questionable and such operations had a high failure rate. Individuals genuinely motivated by an ideological cause could be more difficult to deter.

So, Iran's ability to find someone willing to carry out a plot is not necessarily the same as its ability to command a disciplined terrorist cell.

Hezbollah's surveillance operations and Iran's American networks

Iran's relationship with Hezbollah adds another layer to the problem. The Lebanese organisation has long served as an important partner in Tehran's regional strategy, although Hezbollah should not automatically be treated as an operational arm of Iran for every individual incident. American authorities have nevertheless uncovered Hezbollah-linked surveillance operations inside the country.

In 2019, Ali Kourani was sentenced to 40 years in prison for activities on behalf of Hezbollah's Islamic Jihad Organization. Prosecutors said he had conducted surveillance of potential targets in New York, including government and military-related facilities. He had also gathered information about airports and other infrastructure.

Iranian intelligence has separately targeted Iranian dissidents in America. The 2021 kidnapping conspiracy against journalist Masih Alinejad involved four Iranian intelligence officials, according to the Justice Department. Prosecutors alleged that the network attempted to abduct her from her Brooklyn home and take her to Iran.

In 2024, another Iranian-linked operation against Alinejad involved a man armed with a loaded AK-47 who was arrested outside her home. The FBI investigation exposed the use of criminal intermediaries, including people with connections to organised crime.

These cases show that Iranian intelligence has developed an ability to conduct surveillance and recruit individuals within American communities. They do not, however, establish that Hezbollah maintains an activated network of attack-ready sleeper cells across the US.

Concernes resurfaced with Epic Fury

The first weeks of Operation Epic Fury brought these concerns into focus. On March 9, ABC News reported that American authorities had intercepted encrypted communications believed to have originated in Iran. A federal alert described a transmission as potentially serving as an operational trigger for sleeper assets abroad.

The following day, the Los Angeles Times reported that law-enforcement agencies had been instructed to remain vigilant. Horace Frank, former head of counterterrorism for the Los Angeles Police Department, said sleeper cells had always been a concern involving Iran and its proxies. He believed the conflict could make affiliated groups more desperate.

Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations, argued that the longer the war continued, the greater Tehran's incentive to use asymmetric methods against America. He specifically identified sleeper agents, individuals inspired by Iranian propaganda, cyberattacks and attacks against critical infrastructure.

Hoffman also raised a question about America's preparedness. He pointed to the Department of Homeland Security's growing emphasis on immigration enforcement and concerns that workforce reductions could have weakened the institutional knowledge required for counterterrorism operations. He meant American agencies responsible for detecting unconventional threats might be operating with diminished resources.

Sleeper cells or lone attackers?

Colin Clarke, executive director of the Soufan Center, told CNN in March that Iran was capable of playing a long game. A genuine sleeper operation, he explained, would not necessarily be activated immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. An individual could have been living in the US for years before receiving instructions.

Clarke also acknowledged that intelligence agencies did not know what threshold would prompt Tehran to activate such capabilities.

Wechsler said the absence of Iranian-linked sleeper-cell attacks in the US during the opening weeks of the war had reduced the likelihood of such a network being operational. He cautioned, however, that the possibility had not disappeared.

The CNN investigation made another important observation that attacks by individuals inspired by the conflict had proved deadlier than the organised assassination plots attributed to Iran. It cited the Austin shooting and an attack on a Jewish institution in Michigan during the first week of the war. Investigators suspected political and ideological motivations, although they did not establish that Tehran had directed either operation. The incidents proved that a person inspired by Iranian propaganda may not necessarily be an Iranian operative. Conflating the two would exaggerate the evidence of Iran's direct operational reach.

Iran's record suggests a long-term strategy

Matthew Levitt argued in March in Foreign Affairs that the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the damage to Iran's security establishment could make the leadership more willing to authorise international attacks. Levitt also pointed to Iranian-linked plots uncovered in Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom following the beginning of the war.

Levitt's research offers a useful measure of the scale of Iranian external operations. In February 2022, his study documented 98 publicly known cases dating back to 1979. By August that year, his database had grown to 105. Of the 62 cases he tracked over the preceding decade, 18 involved operations in the United States. The cases included assassination attempts, surveillance and abduction plots, rather than only completed attacks.

Iran's most devastating proxy attacks against Americans have historically occurred overseas. The 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut killed 241 American servicemen. The 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia killed 19 US military personnel. Both demonstrate the lethal potential of Iran's relationships with militant organisations.

But the American homeland presents a different operational challenge. Iran has shown that it can recruit individuals and organise surveillance inside the country. It has not demonstrated a comparable record of successfully executing mass-casualty attacks there.

The danger of misreading Iran's options

The dirty-bomb warning comes at a particularly sensitive moment. Trump has political reasons to avoid restarting a costly war, especially following the Republican losses in the midterms. Iran, meanwhile, has an incentive to demonstrate that American military superiority cannot insulate the US from retaliation. But the intelligence does not establish that an attack is imminent. Nor does it prove that Iran has an operational radiological or chemical weapons network inside Washington.

The more immediate concern is that Iran may be exploring ways to exploit people and networks already present in America. The Bolton and Merchant cases show that Iranian-directed plots can function without conventional sleeper cells. The Alinejad investigations demonstrate that Iranian intelligence has repeatedly attempted to use criminal intermediaries against targets on American soil.

That is the uncomfortable lesson behind the latest warning. Iran does not necessarily need to match American military power to create a serious security crisis inside the US. Its history suggests that it has spent decades cultivating alternative means of retaliation. Whether it has now moved from considering those options to preparing an actual attack remains the most important unanswered question.
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