Trump's backing won't break Taliban while Pakistan's crisis spreads to Tehran

US President Donald Trump's endorsement of Pakistan's fourth and most vicious air strikes since 2021 against a militarily weak Taliban is unlikely to help Pakistan achieve its strategic goal of a complete surrender of the Taliban regime. Having successfully fought against the US and its allies in a prolonged guerilla war for two decades, the Taliban remain unfazed despite suffering losses in terms of military hardware, civilian casualties and damages to property. Hence, for the Afghan Taliban, the American support to Pakistan is of little consequence.

Before launching the air strikes, Pakistan blamed the Taliban for sheltering terrorists involved in terror attacks in Pakistan without presenting any evidence. On the other hand, the Afghan Taliban accuses Pakistan of sheltering elements linked to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and launching them into Afghanistan. Similarly, the Taliban claim that the attacks within Pakistan by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are an internal issue of Pakistan. The reality is that both countries are miserly with the truth.

The correct picture is that the ISKP and the Taliban are continuously fighting battles for dominance in Afghanistan, whereas the TTP has a strong component of locally recruited and radicalised Pakistani youth. Pakistan is conveniently ignoring these facts. But at the same time, it is also true that the TTP and Afghan Taliban share a special relationship, as both fought together against the US and allied forces. The recent flare-up between Afghanistan and Pakistan was triggered by two suicide attacks in Pakistan last month. The one targeting a Shia Imambara in Islamabad killing about 30 worshippers was owned by the ISKP, whereas the killing of a lieutenant colonel of Pakistan army in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was believed to have been carried out by the TTP.


Pakistan army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif don't realise that repeated praise at international level by Trump would be counterproductive in the long run. Asim Munir and Shehbaz Sharif may be using the opportunity to ruthlessly supress domestic dissent, but at the same time have to pursue a perilous foreign policy. The explanation given by Pakistan's defence minister that it may not be possible for the government to annoy the US given Pakistan's precarious economic situation would sound lame to ordinary folks on the streets. Trump knows it and is fully exploiting the same.

The reality is that the foreign policy being pursued by Pakistan has not gone down well among the masses. The Pakistani establishment is conveniently ignoring the strong anti-US and anti-army sentiment in the country. Hence, their dancing to the tunes of Trump on the issues of Palestine and Iran is being resented. The protests by Tehreek-e-Labbaik, a radical Sunni extremist organisation, on the issue of Palestine was brutally suppressed. Similarly, protests have erupted across Pakistan over the killing of Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei, with ten protesters losing their lives in police firing in Karachi, while they were marching towards the US consulate.

Now that Khamenei has been killed, the US-Israel policymakers would be eyeing a complete regime change and splintering Iran into ungovernable regions, a repeat of Iraq, Syria and Libya. In Syria, the territory of the country has been usurped by Israel and Turkiye with the backing of the US. Ahmed al Sharaa, a former Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorist, is now ruling a major part of splintered Syria. He has also been hosted by Trump in the White House. But both countries should also realise that a weakened central authority in Iran may give rise to non-state actors, who could turn against their creators.

Meanwhile, if Trump finds it difficult to achieve his objective of complete surrender of Iran despite having capacity to cause widespread damage to this highly sanctioned country, his demands on Pakistan will soon multiply. Besides use of Pakistani military infrastructure, Trump's demands may include giving fresh impetus to activities of non-state actors like Jaish al-Adl, a Baloch Sunni separatist group running a campaign of terror attacks in Sistan-Balochistan province of Iran. That may include providing the latest weapons and liberal finances using Pakistan's long border with Iran.

Iran has always alleged that elements associated with Jaish al-Adl receive support from Pakistan, a charge the latter denies. In fact, Iran had launched missile strikes in January 2024 on suspected Jaish al-Adl hideouts in Pakistan's Balochistan province. Hence any cooperation with the US will anger not only Iran but also its ally China, with whom Pakistan shares a special strategic and economic relationship.

It is true that there is no comparison between the conventional military capabilities of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but Pakistan perhaps underestimates the capacity of Afghan Taliban to unleash a wave of terror attacks across Pakistan through their erstwhile ally TTP. That is why Afghan Taliban are unlikely to sever their ties with the TTP.

At the same time, the danger of annoying both China and Iran, who share borders with Pakistan and view the bonhomie between Trump and Pakistani establishment with deep suspicion and concern, will have long-term ramifications for Pakistan's internal and external security dimensions. Pakistan will find it extremely difficult to maintain a balance between the US on one side and Iran-China on the other. In these challenging times, Asim Munir, who controls the foreign policy, is bound to falter badly.

(The writer is a former Intelligence Bureau officer who served in Pakistan)