Trucial States to crucial states: Why Modi has smelt great opportunity in UAE and Gulf countries

By Ashok Malik

In the days of the British Raj, the Arab tribal principalities that now comprise the United Arab Emirates were known as the Trucial States. The word “trucial” is a rarely-used adjective derived from "truce". Its use reflected the unique arrangement that British India had with the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms.

There was no direct rule, but an influence on those states was seen as necessary to maintain political stability in the broader west Asian region and in the Indian Ocean. In return, Calcutta and later New Delhi (the capitals of the Raj) provided a security umbrella.

It wasn’t just about security, though. Where the Trucial States really benefited was in capacity building. The origins of the armed forces and city polices of the modern-day UAE lie in training and knowledge sharing from British India. Gradually, the oasis of Dubai became a sort of western entrepôt to the Indian mainland, just as Singapore served the same purpose in the east.

In Dubai and Sharjah and Abu Dhabi, or even Oman for that matter and among other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, this made India a social and economic model. Indeed, Bombay (today’s Mumbai) was as much a glamorous holiday destination for old residents of the UAE as Dubai is for contemporary Indians.

It is useful to keep this history in mind while assessing Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the UAE and the expansive joint statement that flowed from it. India doesn’t have the same military and political reach in Asia that the British Empire did; the equation is far, far from that. Nevertheless India’s emerging doctrine for the Indian Ocean and its near-neighbourhood does borrow elements from the strategic architecture of the Raj.

To what degree this can be done in a more equal world, with no overarching suzerain, and with the Emirates being flush with capital that India needs (rather than the other way round) will be a test for the coming period. Of course, here, as in several other foreign policy bets that Modi has taken, much depends on how quickly the Indian economy returns to a high-growth path.

It is easy to see what the UAE relationship holds for India, from potentially freezing Dawood Ibrahim’s assets in Dubai to getting UAE sovereign wealth funds to invest in Indian infrastructure. Yet, what does the UAE want? What is the long view from Abu Dhabi and Dubai?

The UAE and GCC states are faced with three major challenges. First, they realise the American military and security umbrella – which almost seamlessly replaced the British umbrella – is receding. America’s appetite for west Asian oil and its appetite for foreign wars have declined simultaneously; the former will probably never return.

Second, the threat from forces such as Islamic State is of a different order from earlier Islamist radical militias that were either easier to manipulate and control or fought infidels far away. This time it is closer home.