Saudi Arabia’s Houthi trap: The underdog sets the price of war

A rag-tag army in slippers is terrorising a high-tech military power which is also the biggest defence spender in the Arab world. Behind Saudi Arabia's continuing Houthi nightmare is bad economics of war and a brutal asymmetry of warfare.

The Houthis have amply demonstrated how Saudi Arabia’s military superiority has failed to deliver security on its southern flank. Their renewed attacks have reached strategic Saudi infrastructure, including Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport and facilities belonging to oil giant Aramco, while the Yemeni government struggles to contain their advances.

In Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city, Houthi forces are now tightening their siege, choking supplies and threatening one of the Saudi-backed Yemeni government’s last major strongholds in the southern highlands. The latest escalation shows that the Houthis are not simply surviving the war but setting the price of it for Saudi Arabia which appears helpless against what was once called a mere mountain militia.


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What blunts the edge of Saudi Arabia's superior military

Saudi Arabia spent around $83 billion on defence in 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The kingdom operates advanced American fighter aircraft and Patriot and THAAD air-defence systems, alongside sophisticated weapons acquired from Europe. But these capabilities have not prevented Houthi missiles and drones from hitting civil and oil assets deep inside its territory.

The problem is partly one of economics. An expensive interceptor may be needed to destroy a drone or missile assembled from relatively cheap components. Even when Saudi Arabia intercepts incoming weapons, the attacker can impose costs through ammunition expenditure, operational disruption and the need to maintain round-the-clock surveillance.

Saudi Arabia has an enormous area to protect, with threats approaching from several directions. Airports, oil installations and population centres cannot all be defended equally against repeated attacks with expensive interceptors.

This does not mean Saudi air defences are ineffective as they have prevented damage and casualties on numerous occasions. But defending a sprawling country is a different task from defeating an adversary whose weapons can be launched from dispersed locations in neighbouring Yemen.

The Houthis understand that asymmetric edge they have. They do not need to destroy the Saudi military but just make the kingdom’s security increasingly expensive and its economic infrastructure more vulnerable.

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The Houthis’ ability to adapt

The image of fighters in slippers carrying rifles obscures the transformation of the Houthi arsenal. The movement began with relatively limited capabilities but has acquired ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones, many resembling Iranian designs. It has also developed domestic assembly and procurement networks that make a sustained military campaign possible.

The Houthis had recruited as many as 350,000 fighters by 2024, illustrating the scale of their mobilisation. Their strength lies not just in sophisticated weapons but in the combination of manpower, local knowledge and the capacity to absorb losses.

A recent Wall Street Journal report has described Iranian assistance to the Houthis involving intelligence, training, weapons and guidance from IRGC personnel and Hezbollah. Iran denies directing the latest attacks but the evidence points to significant external support, although it does not establish that Iran controls every Houthi military decision.

An emerging complication is the movement’s procurement of Chinese-origin components. As per recent reports, the Houthis were attempting to develop a medium-range ballistic missile modelled on Iran’s Kheibar Shekan. Intercepted shipments reportedly contained missile-related components sourced from Chinese suppliers. This may not mean that the Chinese government knowingly supplied the parts, nor does it prove that the proposed missile is operational.

Nevertheless, the reported effort suggests that the Houthis are seeking greater independence in weapons production. That would make their arsenal harder to degrade by targeting a single supplier or disrupting one supply route.

Saudi Arabia's anti-Houthi weapon is weak

Air power can destroy Houthi weapons depots and launch sites but cannot secure roads, hold towns or dismantle an entrenched political movement. This has been one of the central problems of Saudi intervention in Yemen. Saudi Arabia's best weapon to contain the Houthi threat is the Yemeni forces but they are not strong enough to control the Houthis.

Yemen's internationally recognised government has long suffered from fragmentation among competing factions, regional loyalties and armed groups with different political objectives. Saudi Arabia has consequently had to support forces whose ability to coordinate a sustained offensive remains uncertain. Taiz illustrates this problem. The Houthis were tightening their siege of the city, worsening shortages of food, water and medical supplies. The city is important because it is a major urban stronghold for anti-Houthi forces and occupies a strategic position between the Red Sea coast and southern Yemen.

The Houthis’ territorial gains near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have added another dimension. Control around this maritime chokepoint gives them leverage over a route central to international trade. Their pressure on Taiz could also weaken the government’s position further south.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are now showing signs of renewed coordination in support of anti-Houthi forces, according to reports. But additional funding and air support will not automatically solve the problem of divided command structures or produce cohesive ground forces.

Saudi Arabia's biggest risk

Saudi Arabia faces the dire prospect of a prolonged war of attrition which can seriously degrade its oil infrastructure and thus impose a high economic cost when Saudi Arabia is trying to revitalise its economy.

Intensifying airstrikes could damage Houthi infrastructure, but it risks further civilian casualties without guaranteeing that the movement loses its ability to retaliate. Negotiations could reduce immediate risks, but the Houthis may have little incentive to make concessions while their battlefield position is improving.

The regional dimension complicates matters further. US President Donald Trump publicly endorsed Saudi Arabia accepting Israeli assistance against the Houthis. Such cooperation could strengthen intelligence sharing and air defence but won't guarantee a stable victory against the Houthis. Turkey and Pakistan have not shown any eagerness to jump in to help Saudi Arabia despite the Mecca defence pact but they might be helping in other ways. The danger is that external assistance may expand while the underlying political and military problems remain unresolved. Even a more effective defensive shield would not necessarily remove the Houthis’ territorial control or their capacity to rebuild weapons stocks.

Saudi Arabia's air force, financial resources and international partnerships surely give it substantial advantages. But those advantages may not translate automatically into a decisive outcome against a movement rooted in Yemen’s local political and social landscape.

The Houthis’ greatest achievement may be that they have made a much wealthier adversary fight on terms that suit them. They are setting a high price of war for Saudi Arabia with cheap weapons. Unless Saudi Arabia’s military pressure is matched by a more coherent and stronger Yemeni political and ground strategy against the Houthis, the kingdom risks remaining trapped in a conflict where tactical successes won't produce lasting security.