New rung on Iran's escalation ladder: A smart tactic or NATO war?

Iran’s reported consideration of attacks on US military targets in Europe appears less an indication that Tehran wants a war with Europe than a warning about what could happen if Washington resumes large-scale attacks.

The Financial Times reported on Wednesday that Iranian officials and people close to the regime have discussed possible attacks on US military targets in southern and southeastern Europe, including facilities in Bulgaria and Cyprus, if President Donald Trump escalates the conflict. Iranian planners have also reportedly considered attacks on subsea infrastructure around the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran has already demonstrated that it can impose costs on American forces and regional partners. Extending that threat to US facilities in Europe would force Washington to consider the vulnerability of its military network across a much wider geography. It could also make European governments question whether allowing American forces to use their territory is worth exposing them to Iranian retaliation.


But the strategy carries an obvious danger for Tehran. An attack on a NATO member could transform an increasingly unpopular US-Iran conflict into a direct European security crisis and potentially bring NATO into the war.

Also Read | Iran says it controls Hormuz, but the ships tell a different story

The deterrence calculation

Iran cannot compete with the United States in conventional military power. Its advantage lies in making American operations more expensive, exposing US personnel to attack and creating political problems for countries hosting American forces.

That logic has already been applied in the Middle East as seen in Iranian attacks against numerous American military sites and other targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. A Washington Post analysis May using satellite imagery found damage to at least 228 structures across US-linked bases or sites in the region, although US officials disputed some interpretations. Often Trump has said he halted planned attacks on Iran due to pressure from these Gulf allies.

The reported European option would therefore be a geographical extension of an existing strategy.

Bulgaria is particularly significant. It approved the temporary deployment of up to eight US KC-135 tanker aircraft and 250 American personnel at Bezmer Air Base in July. The aircraft are intended to support US operations in the Middle East. Bulgarian officials have stressed that the base is being used for logistical purposes and that American aircraft will not conduct combat operations from Bulgarian territory.

From Bulgaria’s perspective, that distinction is important but not from Tehran’s perspective. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has pressed Bulgaria and Cyprus to reconsider the use of their territory for American operations, warning that the presence of US aircraft could implicate them in what Tehran regards as aggression against Iran.

The potential Iranian message is therefore that if European territory helps sustain American attacks on Iran, European territory can become part of the cost of those attacks.

That could force Washington to consider not only retaliation against US bases in the Gulf but also the vulnerability of American forces and logistics in Europe. It could simultaneously encourage European governments to pressure Washington against further escalation. Iran does not need to defeat the US militarily to achieve that effect. It only needs to make escalation more politically and militarily expensive.

Also Read | Trump posts map showing Strait of Hormuz as US territory

The missile question

The most important evidence concerning Iran’s geographical reach came in March, when two Iranian ballistic missiles were reportedly launched toward Diego Garcia, the remote British territory in the Indian Ocean hosting a major US-UK military facility. The missiles did not hit the base. British officials said one fell short and another was intercepted. Diego Garcia is approximately 4,000 kilometres from Iran, prompting reassessment of Tehran’s missile capabilities.

Before that incident, Iran had publicly maintained a self-imposed limit of roughly 2,000 kilometres for its ballistic missiles. Its known inventory includes systems such as the Sejjil, Emad, Ghadr, Shahab-3, Khorramshahr and Kheibar, with several assessed at around 2,000 kilometres and some estimates extending to roughly 2,500 kilometres. Iran also possesses the Kh-55 cruise missile, whose reported range is around 3,000 kilometres.

But Diego Garcia did not prove that Iran possesses a mature and reliable 4,000-kilometre ballistic missile force. Both missiles failed to destroy the target.

Missile range is also not a fixed number independent of payload. A missile may travel farther with a much lighter warhead, but that reduces its destructive effect. Accuracy presents another challenge. Hitting a specific military facility thousands of kilometres away requires reliable intelligence and targeting capabilities, not simply sufficient missile range.

The Diego Garcia episode therefore shows that Iran may be experimenting with a much longer reach, but it does not establish that Tehran can accurately strike distant European capitals.

Southeastern Europe is a different matter because it is much closer. Iranian ballistic missiles have already entered Turkish airspace during the current conflict, with NATO defences intercepting them. One missile was brought down in southern Turkey, with debris falling between US and NATO facilities.

That is stronger evidence for the European threat than the Diego Garcia episode. Turkey is a NATO member, and Iranian missiles have already reached its airspace. At the same time, their interception demonstrates that reaching Europe and successfully striking a European target are two different problems. NATO has established ballistic-missile-defence capabilities, including Aegis Ashore installations in Romania and Poland, as well as naval and other land-based systems. Tehran must therefore consider not just whether its missiles can reach Europe, but whether they can penetrate the defences protecting potential targets.

The NATO trap

Bulgaria as an Iranian is especially sensitive because it is both a NATO and EU member. If Iran attacked a US facility in Bulgaria, the political consequences could depend heavily on what was hit and whether Bulgarian personnel or civilians were killed. But any successful Iranian attack on NATO territory could create enormous pressure for collective action.

NATO’s Article 5 provides that an armed attack against one member can be treated as an attack against all. It does not automatically require every member to declare war as the affected ally must request collective action, and individual members determine what assistance they consider necessary. Article 6 also imposes geographical limits on the treaty’s mutual-assistance obligations.

Nevertheless, NATO has now directly responded to the specific FT report. A NATO official said that the alliance is prepared to address any threat and will always do what is necessary to defend all allies.

That is not a declaration that NATO will enter the US-Iran war, nor does it mean Article 5 would automatically be invoked following an Iranian attack. But it is an unmistakable deterrence message that Iran should not assume that an attack on US military assets located on allied territory would remain a purely bilateral confrontation.

This creates a paradox for Iran. The more seriously it threatens European bases, the more it risks convincing Europeans that Iran itself is becoming a direct security threat.

An Iranian strike that kills Bulgarian civilians or military personnel would be especially difficult for European governments to treat as merely part of an American war. Domestic pressure to respond would increase, while NATO would face pressure to demonstrate that its collective-defence commitments have substance.

Cyprus is different, but still dangerous

Cyprus as a target presents a more complicated case. The Republic of Cyprus is an EU member but not a NATO member, while Britain maintains sovereign base areas on the island, including RAF Akrotiri.

Iran has already demonstrated its willingness to target British facilities there as a drone incident months ago had shown. Iran has warned Cyprus about foreign military bases on the island, while Iranian officials have objected to British cooperation with US military operations.

For Iranian planners, Cyprus could therefore appear politically different from Bulgaria. An attack on a British facility would directly target the United Kingdom but would not carry exactly the same NATO implications as an attack on Bulgarian territory.

Even so, the British bases are embedded in the wider European security system. A serious Iranian attack would almost certainly generate pressure for a broader European response.

Iran may be hoping European governments would blame Washington for dragging them into the conflict rather than Tehran for attacking their territory. That is far from certain.

Missiles more effective if not launched

This may ultimately be the most important aspect of Iranian considerations as FT has reported. Iran could be trying to influence European decision-making before firing a missile. The message is essentially that if you allow American forces to use your territory, your territory becomes part of the war.

Iran has already used this argument diplomatically through its contacts with Bulgaria and Cyprus. A credible military threat makes the diplomatic argument more powerful. A Bulgarian or other European government could begin asking whether hosting American tankers or other military assets is worth exposing its territory to Iranian retaliation.

In that sense, the most effective Iranian use of the European threat might be not to launch it at all.

Washington nevertheless has reason to take the threat seriously. The US has already learned that Iranian retaliation cannot necessarily be confined to locations where American commanders expect it. US forces are also dealing with finite missile-defence resources, meaning that every additional geographical area requiring protection imposes costs. Adding Europe to that defensive problem would force Washington to protect American bases, logistics facilities and military personnel across countries including Germany, Italy, Spain, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece.

Iran would not need to overwhelm those defences. It could simply force the US to devote more aircraft, ships, interceptors, intelligence assets and personnel to protecting them. That is precisely the kind of asymmetric pressure Iran has used elsewhere.

The real red line

Iran is unlikely to believe it can defeat NATO in a conventional confrontation. Nor would attacking European territory make obvious military sense if Iran’s only objective were revenge.

The more plausible calculation is coercive. Iran wants the US to understand that another major attack could produce retaliation outside the traditional Middle Eastern theatre. It wants American commanders to worry about European infrastructure and deploy mote military resources there thus spreading them thin, and European governments to recognise that cooperation with Washington carries risks. Ultimately, it may hope that those governments pressure Trump to stop escalating.

The danger is that deterrence can fail spectacularly. A threat against a European base is one thing but an intercepted Iranian missile over NATO territory is another. A successful strike that kills European civilians or military personnel would be different again. At that point, European governments could face intense domestic pressure to respond, NATO could face pressure to demonstrate that Article 5 has meaning, and Washington would have another powerful reason to retaliate. The conflict could then move from an American-led war against Iran into a much broader confrontation involving the world’s most powerful military alliance.

The crucial question is therefore not simply whether Iran can reach Europe but whether Iran believes it can use that capability as a threat without crossing the political threshold that turns deterrence into a NATO war.