IAF-commissioned book takes a candid look at the 1965 war

It was the first air battle between India and Pakistan. The Indian Air Force was numerically superior, with 28 combat squadrons to PAF's 11, but it was saddled with technologically inferior fighters. And, caught off-guard by the PAF offensive, India had lost 35 of its aircraft on the ground during pre-emptive strikes — one on Pathankot on September 6 and then on Kalaikunda, a day later.

IAF's latest history of its operations in the 1965 war acknowledges it "suffered disproportionately higher losses" than PAF. But it says the force showed "resilience and determination" to set aside initial losses and gradually turn the tables on its adversary with effective counter-strikes to "prosecute" the war till the ceasefire came into effect on September 22.

The IAF-commissioned book, The Duels of the Himalayan Eagle: The First Indo-Pak Air War, is being released on September 1, as part of the war's golden jubilee celebrations that will last from August 28 to September 22. The Army, too, is coming out with its new account of the 1965 war. As reported by TOI earlier, the Modi government's plan to celebrate the 1965 war as "a great victory" over Pakistan has raised quite a few eyebrows because even the defence ministry's official war history describes its end as a stalemate.

The new IAF book itself notes that the MoD's official history division had concluded: "Taking an overall view of the air war, it appears clear neither side won any decisive victory. Both mauled each other, but could not kill. Both operated without a clear-cut plan and failed to concentrate their resources on close air support (to the ground forces), or counter air attacks to achieve a decisive victory."

The book is written by Air Marshal (retd) Bharat Kumar, who was a young fighter pilot during the war. He got access to official records, squadron diaries and talked to several veterans for the 320-page book that debunks all accounts that portray PAF as a clear winner because the IAF suffered greater losses.

In all, IAF lost 59 out of its inventory of 460 aircraft, while PAF lost 43 of its 186 aircraft during the war. IAF grappled with first-generation subsonic fighters like Vampire and Dassault Toofani as well as second-generation transonic ones like Mystere, Hawker Hunter and Gnats, apart from the bomber-interdictor Canberra. It had just a handful of third-generation supersonic MiG-21s, which were then being acquired from Russia and would remain its mainstay for decades to come.

But Pakistan, which had cosied up to the US by the mid-1950s, was equipped with F-86 Sabre jets, F-104 Starfighters and B-57 Martin Canberras, along with much-better better weapons and radars. Moreover, 13 of IAF's 28 squadrons had been deployed in the eastern and central sectors to tackle the Chinese threat.

"Whereas Pakistan was fighting on one front, India had to be ready on more than one and therefore had to divide and conserve her resources accordingly," says the book. Replete with veteran accounts of riveting dogfights and bombing missions, it calculates that the effective ratio of combat squadrons between IAF and PAF was 12:10.