Deterrence or declaration? The case for revisiting India’s Cold Start doctrine

In the immediate aftermath of "Operation Sindoor" the Army hierarchy has, on various fora, articulated its intent to ramp up its Cold Start Doctrine and rechristen it as 'Cold Strike". In this context, it might be instructive to examine how this doctrine has played out since its adoption

The origins of what came to be known as India's Cold Start doctrine lie in institutional disappointment rather than strategic ambition. Its immediate trigger was "Operation Parakram". Launched by India in Dec 2001 following the terrorist attack on our Parliament it involved our largest military mobilization since 1971. This operation imposed heavy financial costs, accelerated wear and tear of equipment, disrupted operational readiness and tragically also led to loss of lives. Yet after nearly ten months of mobilisation the exercise concluded without delivering any discernible political, diplomatic or military outcome.

For the Indian Army, Parakram exposed a serious operational deficiency: while we possessed conventional superiority we lacked the ability to translate that advantage into timely and credible coercive force under the sub continental nuclear overhang. From the Army's perspective the problem was not of intent, but of structural (Politico-military) and organizational limitations. In response the Army undertook internal introspection, commissioned a high level study (refer Gen NC Vij's - Alone in The Ring) and developed what was initially conceived as a contingency response concept rather than a formal doctrine.


The core idea was operationally straightforward. In the event of a Pakistani sponsored terrorist attack our Army would respond within 48 to 72 hours with limited shallow thrusts across multiple sectors of the International Border / Line of Control. These thrusts would avoid deep penetration, remain below Pakistan's nuclear red lines yet impose sufficient military and political cost to reinforce deterrence. Speed, simultaneity and limited objectives were central to the concept. Some internal restructuring was undertaken within the Army to create and locate integrated -manoeuver - formations, that could execute desired offensive operations from almost zero warning (Cold Start).

However a critical flaw was embedded at the very stage of conceptualization. Cold Start was developed almost entirely as an Army exercise. The Indian Air Force and the Navy were not seriously involved in its formulation, nor perhaps was the concept presented to the CCS for examination and approval (we may recall the statement of the NSA claiming ignorance). The omission was not merely procedural; it reflected deeper systemic barriers to inter service interaction and civil military communications on national military security. In classical terms, Cold Start was never a doctrine. Doctrines are jointly formulated and politically sanctioned. Cold Start by contrast was an Army-specific plan. It lacked inter service integration, political - ownership and formal ratification. Yet within a few years of its conception, the Army leadership-perhaps without explicit government approval- began discussing the concept publicly across think tanks, strategic seminars and media platforms.

This public projection marked a turning point. Without ever being officially declared -Cold Start acquired the status of a de facto doctrine in domestic and international discourse. This declaratory drift (including an Army chief disowning the concept) had significant consequences.

First, it provided Pakistan with strategic justification to pursue the development and induction of tactical nuclear weapons. The development of short-range nuclear missile systems such as the Nasr was framed as a defensive necessity. This narrative found traction among international analysts even though such weapons lowered the nuclear threshold and increased instability.

While the government has neither formally endorsed nor repudiated this assertion its silence effectively lent legitimacy to the concept. If Cold Start/Strike is now being projected as a standing response framework it merits a comprehensive review first by the CDS and then at the CCS.

This brings into focus a more fundamental issue: what purpose does a declaratory doctrine serve? Declaratory doctrines are politico strategic tools. They signal intent, thresholds and resolve, and are issued with explicit government authority. India's " Nuclear Doctrine" is a case in point. Cold Start however began life as a contingency plan and drifted into declaratory space perhaps without political sanction. In doing so, it educated Pakistan about our self-imposed limits. More importantly and critically it diluted - perhaps virtually nullified the most potent weapon in a nation's arsenal - the weapon of "UNCERTAINTY".

The Cold Start doctrine and the contingencies that went with it have been with us for almost two decades. But ironically perhaps not once was it in our basket of options. Mumbai Nov 2008, we didn't go beyond protests. Subsequently since Uri to Pahalgam, we have had our Surgical Strike, Balakote Air strike and Op Sindoor but no "Cold Start".

Revisiting Cold Start is therefore also about assessing weaknesses in India's civil-military processes inter-service integration and doctrine formulation. Any future doctrine must be joint, from inception, and formally approved by the CCS.

Conceptually, strategic ambiguity and uncertainty - ought to be the preferred option to keep our adversary deterred. Flowing from this viewpoint emerges a more fundamental question about our approach to national interests that have a military dimension. Compare Pakistan's approach to its claim over Kashmir since 1947 to what we have done to reclaim POK. With China its been no different.

The writer is ex-DG, Artillery