After Hormuz, Gate of Tears may make the world cry. What about India?

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, is an Arabic phrase which literally means the Gate of Tears or the Gate of Grief. The fear is it may live up to its name soon. Yemen's Houthi movement has announced a maritime blockade targeting Saudi shipping and has warned shipping companies against loading or unloading cargo at Saudi ports, Reuters has reported. Iran recently instructed the Houthis to prepare to close the Bab el-Mandeb if the United States strikes critical Iranian infrastructure.

With tit-for-tat attacks continuing between the US and Iran, a full disruption of one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints has become a credible risk rather than a distant hypothetical.

The link between Asia and Europe

Bab el-Mandeb is more than a narrow passage between Yemen and the Horn of Africa. It is the southern gateway to the Red Sea and therefore to the Suez Canal. Any vessel travelling between Asia and Europe through the Suez route must pass through it.


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According to data cited by the International Monetary Fund, the Suez-Red Sea corridor carries roughly 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade. It is one of the most heavily used commercial arteries on the planet. Consumer goods, electronics, machinery, industrial inputs, chemicals, agricultural products and energy supplies all move through this route. During the Red Sea disruptions of 2024 by Houthis at the time of Israel's Gaza attacks, IMF PortWatch data showed that traffic through the Suez Canal fell by around 50 percent year-on-year while traffic around the Cape of Good Hope surged by approximately 74 percent as shipping companies rerouted vessels. The figures offered a real-world demonstration of what happens when this corridor comes under threat. Trade does not stop but it becomes more expensive.

The first shock would be to global logistics

The most immediate economic impact of a Bab el-Mandeb closure would not come through oil markets but logistics. When vessels are unable to use the Red Sea route, they must sail around Africa's Cape of Good Hope. Depending on the voyage, this can add between 4,000 and 6,000 nautical miles and extend transit times by 10 to 20 days. What appears to be a delay on paper quickly cascades through the global economy.

The World Bank has argued that the real problem lies in the loss of effective shipping capacity. A ship that spends two additional weeks at sea completes fewer voyages each year. Containers become less available and shipping schedules become unreliable. In such a situation, businesses need larger inventories and more working capital. What begins as a maritime disruption eventually spreads into manufacturing, retail and international trade.

The experience of 2024 showed how rapidly these effects can materialise. Freight rates jumped sharply as vessels diverted around Africa. Shipping companies imposed emergency surcharges. Insurance costs increased. The burden was ultimately passed through the supply chain. The result was not a collapse of commerce but a significant increase in the cost of moving goods around the world.

Europe will bear the brunt

Among major economic regions, Europe is the most exposed to a prolonged closure of Bab el-Mandeb. A substantial portion of Europe's trade with Asia depends on the Suez route. Electronics from East Asia, industrial equipment from China, consumer goods from South and Southeast Asia and components for European manufacturers all move through the Red Sea corridor.

The challenge for Europe is not simply higher shipping costs. European industry relies on tightly integrated supply chains. Delays in the arrival of components can disrupt production schedules, increase inventory costs and reduce competitiveness. Manufacturers may be forced to hold larger stocks while importers absorb higher transport expenses.

That is why institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and UNCTAD have consistently viewed Red Sea disruptions as a mega supply-chain shock as much as a geopolitical event. The longer the disruption lasts, the greater the cumulative strain on trade networks.

A second oil shock in the making?

The energy dimension of the crisis is now considerably more serious than it was a few years ago. According to Reuters, the Bab el-Mandeb waterway was carrying around 7.4 million barrels per day of petroleum in June 2026, equivalent to roughly 7 percent of global oil output. That figure was significantly higher than the 4.2 million barrels per day that moved through the strait a year earlier. The increase reflects a major shift in regional energy flows after disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.

Saudi Arabia sits at the centre of this story. Roughly 70 to 75 percent of Saudi crude and condensate exports are now being routed through the Red Sea port of Yanbu after the effective closure of Hormuz. Kpler data showed that around 75 percent of Saudi Arabia's 5.29 million barrels per day of crude and condensate exports moved through Yanbu in July. Earlier Reuters reporting showed exports from Yanbu approaching 4.6 million barrels per day and Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline operating with capacity of about 7 million barrels per day.

This means Bab el-Mandeb is no longer merely a trade chokepoint but also a critical energy artery. Reuters reported that a full closure of Bab el-Mandeb could place roughly 7 percent of global oil supply at risk and potentially halt Saudi crude exports to major Asian buyers. Even if alternative arrangements were eventually found, energy markets would react immediately. Oil traders, refiners and insurers would begin pricing in the risk of prolonged disruption long before physical shortages emerged.

That is why crude prices have already become highly sensitive to developments in the region. Markets are no longer reacting solely to events in Hormuz. They are reacting to the possibility that the Middle East's two most important export routes could simultaneously come under pressure.

India faces a double exposure

For India, a closure of Bab el-Mandeb would be both a trade shock and an energy shock. India's merchandise trade with Europe is heavily dependent on the Red Sea corridor. Government and industry estimates during the previous crisis suggested that around 80 percent of India's trade with Europe travels through this route. Any disruption therefore has direct consequences for exporters.

Longer routes would increase freight rates and insurance costs while extending delivery schedules. Engineering goods, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, textiles and auto components would all become more expensive to transport. Smaller exporters would face particular pressure because they have less room to absorb sudden increases in logistics costs.

The scale of official concern became evident during the 2024 crisis. In January that year, Bloomberg reported that an initial assessment by the Research and Information System for Developing Countries estimated that prolonged Red Sea disruptions could potentially shave around $30 billion from India's exports. The estimate should be viewed as a scenario rather than a forecast, but it illustrates how seriously policymakers viewed the threat.

India's vulnerability, however, does not end with exports

India is now one of the largest buyers of Russian crude oil. Russian supplies account for more than half of India's crude imports. Much of that oil originates from Russia's Baltic ports and traditionally reaches India through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. During previous Red Sea disruptions, Russian cargoes were rerouted around Africa, demonstrating that supplies can continue flowing even when the shorter route is compromised. The issue is therefore not supply security in the narrow sense but the cost.

A closure of Bab el-Mandeb would force more Russian cargoes onto longer voyages around the Cape of Good Hope. Freight rates would rise and tanker availability would tighten. Working-capital requirements too would increase. The delivered cost of crude reaching Indian refineries would move higher even if Russia continued supplying the same volumes.

For India, therefore, the impact would arrive through two channels. Exporters would face higher logistics costs while refiners would face more expensive crude deliveries.

The world would adapt but pay a price

The history of global shipping suggests that commerce is remarkably adaptable. When one route becomes dangerous, vessels find another and supply chains reorganise and businesses adjust. But adaptation is never free. Every additional mile sailed around Africa raises costs. Every extra day at sea reduces shipping efficiency. Every increase in insurance premiums ripples through supply chains. Every rise in oil prices adds pressure to households and businesses.

That is why Bab el-Mandeb matters far beyond the Middle East. A full closure would not bring the global economy to a halt. It would do something more subtle. It would make trade slower, energy more expensive and growth harder to sustain. In an era already marked by high oil prices, inflation, geopolitical rivalry and fragile supply chains, the Gate of Tears could once again live up to its name.