Gen Z conspiracy: China thinks the West is pushing its youth to quit

For years, China’s rise rested on a vision that rewarded relentless effort. Long working hours, fierce academic competition and sacrifice were justified by the promise of upward mobility and national rejuvenation. But among many young Chinese, the Gen Z generation, that promise now appears increasingly fragile. The “lying flat” or "tang ping" movement, once dismissed as an online fad among the youth, has evolved into a broader expression of frustration with economic insecurity, shrinking opportunities and an unforgiving work culture. China sees a foreign hand behind the trend which is pushing its youth to drop out of work.

Last week, China’s Ministry of State Security accused foreign-backed forces of promoting “lying flat” content to weaken China’s youth and undermine the country’s future development. The warning reflected not merely ideological concern, but deeper anxiety about whether a disillusioned generation could erode the labour discipline and ambition that powered China’s manufacturing miracle and now underpin its technological rivalry with the United States.

The cultural and social debate over tang ping has become intertwined with China’s economic trajectory, demographic pressures and geopolitical ambitions.


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From online slogan to social mood

The phrase “lying flat” entered mainstream Chinese discourse in 2021 after a viral online post argued that young people should reject the exhausting race for material success and instead pursue a minimalist existence. The author of the original Baidu forum post questioned the logic of spending one’s entire life chasing property ownership and conventional family expectations.

The idea resonated because it captured a growing sense of exhaustion among urban youth. China’s notorious “996” work culture -- working from 9 am to 9 pm, six days a week -- had become deeply entrenched in technology firms and other competitive sectors. Yet despite punishing schedules, many young professionals found themselves priced out of the housing market and struggling to secure stable futures.

The movement also emerged at a particularly difficult economic moment. The Covid-19 pandemic disrupted growth, the property sector entered a prolonged crisis and tensions with the West intensified pressure on Chinese exports and investment flows. Youth unemployment climbed sharply. These trends have continued to varying extents. According to the South China Morning Post, China’s unemployment rate among people aged 16 to 24 reached 16.9 per cent recently, even after authorities adjusted statistical methods.

Under such conditions, “lying flat” evolved from a quirky internet slogan into a quiet rejection of hyper-competitive social expectations. Closely related expressions such as “let it rot” or bailan further reflected a mood of resignation among sections of the younger generation.

Analysts have noted that the movement mirrors broader anxieties about social mobility in modern China. Many graduates now believe that no amount of hard work guarantees middle-class stability in an economy where housing, education and healthcare costs continue to rise faster than incomes.

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Why China sees a strategic threat

Chinese authorities initially tried to suppress online discussion of tang ping, with hashtags censored and forums shut down. But over time, the government’s concern became more explicit and ideological.

President Xi Jinping himself warned against the trend in 2021. As per South China Morning Post, Xi was quoted as saying in an article published in 2021 by Qiushi, the party’s flagship political theory journal: “It is necessary to prevent the stagnation of the social class, unblock the channels for upward social mobility, create opportunities for more people to become rich and form an environment for improvement in which everyone participates, avoiding involution and lying flat."

The latest intervention by the Ministry of State Security represents an escalation in tone. As per a report in the state-funded Global Times, the state security authority found that a certain overseas organization had funded various anti-China media outlets and think tanks, concocting narratives such as "struggle equals being exploited" and "class solidification means hard work is useless." It also found another overseas organization had heavily financed "lying-flat influencers," mass-producing short videos promoting ideas like "lying flat is justice" and "resisting rat race equals resisting exploitation," and systematically carrying out "lying-flat brainwashing."

Behind the warning by the Chinese agency lies a genuine structural fear. China’s economic model depends heavily on disciplined labor, high educational attainment and national mobilisation around strategic goals. A generation increasingly skeptical of hard work threatens that foundation.

Unlike some advanced economies that shifted toward consumption-led growth after industrialisation, China still relies significantly on manufacturing competitiveness. At the same time, it is pouring enormous state resources into semiconductors, artificial intelligence, robotics and green technologies to reduce dependence on Western technology.

Those ambitions require not only capital and state planning, but also highly motivated workers, engineers and researchers willing to endure intense competition. The “lying flat” ethos directly challenges the culture of striving which is essential to national progress.

Economic pressures behind the disillusionment

The roots of youth frustration are not difficult to identify. China’s economy has slowed markedly compared to the breakneck growth of earlier decades. Economic expansion that once consistently exceeded 8 or 10 per cent annually now hovers near levels considered modest by Chinese standards. At the same time, social inequality has become more visible. Property prices in major cities remain prohibitively expensive for many young workers. Stable white-collar jobs are harder to secure. Private-sector layoffs in technology and education industries over the past few years have deepened insecurity.

Competition has also intensified dramatically. The Chinese term “involution” or neijuan describes a society trapped in endless competition without corresponding gains in rewards or productivity. Students compete relentlessly for elite university places, graduates compete for scarce jobs and workers compete to demonstrate ever-greater dedication merely to maintain their positions. As per an SCMP report, "The tight employment situation has spurred record applications for government jobs, which are considered an “iron rice bowl”. Last year’s national civil service exam saw 2.8 million candidates competing for just 38,100 positions, compared with 2.6 million candidates seeking slightly more jobs the previous year."

Demographics further complicate the picture. China’s aging population and declining birth rate mean fewer young workers will be available in coming decades. Ironically, the same pressures contributing to “lying flat” -- high costs of living, overwork and pessimism about the future -- are also discouraging marriage and childbearing. This creates a dangerous cycle for policymakers. Economic insecurity fuels disengagement, disengagement undermines productivity and slowing growth then worsens insecurity further.

What it means for China’s future

China’s leadership understands that the country stands at a critical economic transition. The era when cheap labour and mass manufacturing alone guaranteed rapid growth is ending. Future competitiveness will depend increasingly on innovation, advanced technology and highly skilled human capital. That transition requires a workforce that is creative, motivated and optimistic about the future. A generation marked by exhaustion and disillusionment poses a serious challenge to those ambitions. The “lying flat” trend does not mean Chinese youth have abandoned work altogether. Most still pursue careers and financial stability. But the movement reflects weakening faith in the idea that hard work and sacrifice will necessarily produce meaningful rewards.

For China, that shift may ultimately prove more consequential than any temporary economic slowdown. Manufacturing power can be rebuilt through investment. Technological capabilities can be accelerated through state support. But restoring social optimism is far more difficult. The deeper danger for China is not that millions of young people will literally stop working. It is that an increasing number may quietly disengage from the national project that has driven China’s extraordinary rise for four decades.